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Suav Yuav Kav Thoob Ntiajteb

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26276337532_714bf536ea_b.jpg?itok=glJtd3

A Dangerous Superpower Showdown is Brewing:

China vs. America in Asia

By   

Asia’s recent decades of economic growth have depended, among other things, on a remarkable period of regional peace and stability. The region will only keep growing if that can be sustained. We cannot take this for granted. The peace we have known has resulted from an unusual situation that emerged in the early 1970s, when China decided to follow Japan in accepting the United States as the primary strategic power in Asia. That has meant that US primacy has been uncontested by any major regional power in Asia, eliminating major-power rivalry as a source of tension and conflict.

But US primacy in Asia is now contested again. China no longer accepts American leadership as the foundation of the regional strategic order and instead seeks a ‘new model of great power relations’. This probably means it wants to take America’s place as Asia’s primary power, and its new strategic weight means we have to take this seriously. Few, if any, in Asia want China to get what it wants. US leadership has served the region well and no one wants to live under China’s shadow.

But wishes are no substitute for good policy. We delude ourselves if we imagine that Asia could be transformed economically by the biggest shift in the distribution of wealth in history without also being transformed politically and strategically. It would have been truly remarkable if China had not sought a bigger regional role as its power has grown, as every rising power in history has done before it.

So rather than just wishing that the old order might last for ever, Asia’s leaders have to start thinking about how the inevitable transformation of the regional order can be managed peacefully. Throughout the transformation, regional leaders should strive to preserve as many of the positive features of the old order as possible.

So far they have failed to do that. The problem starts in Washington, where US policymakers and analysts have remained in denial about the seriousness of China’s challenge. They underestimate China’s power and resolve, which leads them to think that low-cost low-risk gestures, like those promoted under President Obama’s ‘pivot’, can persuade Beijing to back off. Policymakers still assume that China would not risk the economic costs or military risks of a confrontation with the United States, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Recent events in the South China Sea, for example, sugg[quote]est that Washington is more risk-averse than Beijing.

And this year’s strange presidential primaries sugg[quote]est that America’s resolve is unlikely to stiffen after November. Donald Trump’s mindless braggadocio is as sure a sign of the American electorate’s dwindling commitment to sustain the costs of global leadership as Bernie Sanders’ refusal even to discuss foreign policy.

 

All this is compounded by what seems like excessive confidence on the other side of the Pacific. For Beijing it has become too easy to reach an assumption opposite to Washington’s — that it will be the US that backs off in the face of modest Chinese pressure and not the other way round. China’s actions over maritime disputes in the Spratly Islands and elsewhere seem plainly intended to do just this. They are creating situations that test America’s willingness to risk a military confrontation with China on behalf of its allies. Beijing hopes and expects that the US will fail — and so far they have been proved mostly right.

This creates a very dangerous situation. Of course, neither side wants confrontation, let alone war. But each side expects to be able to achieve its aims without confrontation because it assumes the other will back down. And we should be under no illusion about the weight of the stakes for both countries. The maritime issues in dispute are not the cause of US–China rivalry any more than the status of Serbs in the Austro–Hungarian Empire was the cause of the First World War.

Their contest is driven by mutually incompatible visions of the future Asian order and their roles in it. For both of them, this goes to central questions of national identity and destiny. These are just the kinds of issues that great powers do go to war over, and the mutual underestimation of each other’s resolve is how such wars start when neither wants nor expects them to.

The risks may well grow in future if Beijing becomes impatient with Taiwan’s new government. Tensions across the Strait, which eased under President Ma, would then start to rise again, adding another, even more emotive focus for US–China rivalry.

None of this is to say that confrontation or conflict is inevitable. But it is to say that the risks are very real and the trends are negative. Turning those trends around by finding a way to deescalate the rivalry is essential for setting the conditions for peace, stability and growth in Asia over coming decades.

None of us can afford to leave this to Washington and Beijing, because we simply cannot assume they will get it right. Others with an interest in Asia’s future — and that means not just Asians but everyone else as well — ought to ask what influence can be brought to bear to help manage the transition now underway in Asia much better than it has been so far.

That means recognizing and acknowledging the existence and scale of the risks of escalating rivalry — to break through the complacency that envelopes both Washington and Beijing. It requires us to accept that the old order in Asia is no longer sustainable: we will have a new regional order whether we like it or not. We must therefore think more creatively about what that order might look like. It is too easy to assume that the only alternative to US primacy in Asia is Chinese primacy, and both Washington and Beijing have reasons of their own to encourage that assumption.

But of course there are many other possible foundations for a new Asian order, which would serve the interests of all of us, including the United States and China, much better than either a protracted strugg[quote]le for regional primacy between the world’s two strongest states or a passive acceptance of Chinese hegemony. Our challenge is to explore these alternatives and how they might best be brought about. It is an extraordinarily difficult task, but the stakes could not be higher.

 

Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly,‘Stuck in the middle?’.

============================

WHICH EMPIRE DO YOU PREFER TO LIVE UNDER

IS IT CHINA or UNITED STATES OF AMERICA...?

 

http://1.im.guokr.com/mUkXJ2XvM4NGvhyjjmYb0chk16Bkv9D4iet3VcxCeLLOAQAAEQIAAFBO.png

OR

http://www.bdtorino.net/thumbnail.php?file=usa_political_map_154431287.jpg&size=article_large

 

MUAJ CAIJ KUV MAM ROV TUAJ MUAB...COMMENTS...

 

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http://1.im.guokr.com/mUkXJ2XvM4NGvhyjjmYb0chk16Bkv9D4iet3VcxCeLLOAQAAEQIAAFBO.png

...REALLY SHAME ON CHINA...

 

CHINA...IS RICH & POWERFUL IN MILITAERY WEAPONS & KILLING

BUT BEING POOR AT HEART...IN FEEDING ITS PEOPLE...

 

Hey...People...

 

This is not FUNNY...

 

The whole NOTION that CHINA is a RICH and HAS BECOME A SUPER POWER NATION but IT CAN NOT GIVE THIS GRANDMA and HER 2 GRAND CHILDREN A DECENT LIVING... The GRANDMA has to make a living in the street even though whatever she's doing turns out to be illegal...

 

It should be A SHAME TO CHINA AS A WHOLE NATION IN THE NAME OF BEING RICH and EVEN BECAME A WORLD SUPER POWER BUT COULD NOT FEED A POOR FAMILY LIKE THIS...Beside the Family is being HARASSED by the GOVERNMENT AGENTS UNTIL A BRAVE TODDLER HAS TO KISS ASS OF THOSE GOVERNMENT AGENTS...

 

I sug.gest.... THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO SELL THOSE BILLION DOLLARS MILITARY TOOLS,  EQUIPMENTS, and WEAPONS TO FEED THE CHINESE POOR FAMILY LIKE HIS ONE...

INSTEAD PLANNING TO BULLY ITS NEIGHBORS....

 

INDEED... IT IS A SHAME TO THE HOLE WORLD

TO SEE A STORY LIKE THIS HAPPEN IN CHINA...

 

HAHAHA....CHINA....WHAT A RICH and SUPER POWER NATION INDEED...!

 

SHAME ON CHINA...!

Edited by Nujtxeeg

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Forklift Fight

KEV SIB TXEEB NOJ SIB TXEEB HAUS NYOB SUAV/CHINA

 

CHINA:  FIGHTS OF THE AUTOBOTS

Watch 6 Bulldozers

and

Forklifts Fight It Out in China

Half a dozen bulldozers and front-end loaders got into a battle royale on a Chinese street on April 17th, using their buckets and blades as weapons to push and claw at one another. If reading that sentence made you think, "This is gonna be the best video I watch all day," you are correct. It's like watching a herd of bull Triceratops fighting over a female during mating season.

The clash, which occurred in China's Hebei province near Beijing, was reportedly a fight between two rival construction firms, according to The Daily Mail. It's not clear if anyone was injured in the melee; one of the construction machines was flipped onto its side during the battle, but the driver can clearly be seen scrambling out and clamoring onto another friendly front-end loader.

Not surprisingly, the Hebei Province Public Security Bureau is reportedly investigating the incident.

DON'T FORGET TO SIGN UP FOR THE DRIVE NEWSLETTER

Why, you may ask, were the drivers of these mighty machines using them to inflict extreme property damage with a side order of attempted vehicular homicide? Did the owner of one company spill his drink on the other owner at a party? Did one of the drivers sleep with someone's sister and "forget" to call the next day? Was one of the construction crews Team Batman and the other Team Superman?

Nope. According to reports, they were fighting over a construction contract. Good old-fashioned capitalism at work.

In unrelated news, Mao Zedong's body has reportedly been seen spinning at approximately 1,200 rpm in his mausoleum.

 

TXOG SIAV TUAJ LAWM TIAG LAUJ

IB TSOOM NPOJ YAIG SUAV/CHINA E...!

 

1 ZAG TAS LOS 1 ZAG TUAJ...

MOB TAS LOS YUAV ROV MOB DUA...

NEJ TSEV TXOOS NPOJ SOM CUAB HAIV NEEG SUAV/CHINA E...!

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FILE - President Barack Obama (c) and other leaders of the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries pose for a photo in Manila, Philippines, Nov. 18, 2015.

China Edging Closer to Accepting TPP Reality

After nearly three years of concentrated efforts to counter the U.S.-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and build an alternative trade block, China is now seriously considering the possibility of joining the TPP regime.

"I think it does not make sense to have a world divided by different trade blocks. The U.S. should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB], and China should become part of the TPP," said Wang Huiyao, the president of the Center for China and Globalization, and an advisor to the Chinese government.

“The two sides should stop creating trade bottlenecks and join hands for the expansion of free trade,” Wang told VOA. He added that both China and the U.S. have a lot to gain if they worked within one trade regime.

As the second biggest international trader, China can make a lot of difference to the emerging TPP mechanism, analysts said. At present, 12 countries have agreed to join the TPP.

FILE - TPP Countries and Other Global Trade Agreements
FILE - TPP Countries and Other Global Trade Agreements

Interest in China

At the Asia Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce in Beijing this month, a U.S. official made it clear that Washington was interested in attracting both China and India into the TPP system. This is in contrast to the impression among Chinese experts who think the U.S. has either resisted Beijing's entry or planned to use the TPP to isolate China from a major part of world trade.

Even if Beijing makes a formal decision to join the TPP, it will be a challenging task for it to meet some of the stiff environmental and labor standards laid out in the agreement. A vast section of Chinese industry has grown without any regard to environmental damage, and are often accused of denying workers some of their rights.

But Diane Farrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia at the U.S. Department of Commerce, does not agree. She explained the TPP is elastic enough to accommodate the different conditions of different countries, and give each new member sufficient time to adjust to the standards. "The TPP has been designed to accommodate economies at different stages of development. The standards have to be implemented in a phased manner, and every country will get sufficient time to implement them. This is why Malaysia is in it," Farrell said.

Writing the rules

In February, U.S. President Barack Obama said it would be bad for American businesses and workers if China were allowed to set rules of free trade. "And our concern there was that China was the 800-pound gorilla, and if we allowed them to set trade rules out there, American businesses and American workers were going to be cut out," Obama said on February 22 at the National Governors Association reception while explaining why the TPP was conceived.

China responded saying that the world trade rules in the 21st century should not be written by a single country. The Chinese media reacted more sharply saying the United States is trying to divide the world into two trade blocks. “U.S. politicians like Obama keep spreading canards that nothing from China is good and thus everything Chinese must be resisted," said the official China Daily, adding, "It's time Obama stopped pushing for the TPP at the cost of the vital China-U.S. relations.”

At the same time, there is a sharp realization among many in China that it makes more sense to be part of the TPP regime if it becomes a reality instead of spending a huge amount of effort to counter it.

AIIB, Silk Road efforts

Beijing has obtained some success in its efforts to create an alternative trade block under the banner of the Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road programs, in addition to the AIIB. About 65 countries have agreed to join at least one of them.

FILE - A map illustrating China's silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road, or the so-called "One Belt, One Road" megaproject, is displayed at the Asian Financial Forum in Hong Kong, China Jan. 18, 2016.

The AIIB also recently entered into a co-financing deal with the World Bank. "The World Bank decision will upgrade the status of AIIB. It is already causing a lot of excitement across the world. I am sure the U.S. will begin to notice its importance soon," Wang said.

China has also proposed a free trade route with interconnected ports and roads, both existing and planned projects, running through Asia and Europe. It has also offered financial support and extended its construction muscle to many of the planned projects. The ultimate goal to is ease the movement of Chinese goods and counter challenges like the TPP, observers said.

But the initial success on AIIB and the Silk Road program is closely linked to China's ability to buy[quote] goods and services from different countries and finance projects in those regions. Beijing's ability on this score has been weakened recently by its domestic economic slowdown.

In fact, government economists have been closely looking at the possibility of joining the TPP for a long time, even as efforts progressed for the alternative "Silk" free trade route.

"China should keep paying close attention and at an appropriate time, in accordance with progress on domestic reform, join the TPP, while limiting the costs associated to the greatest degree," the Communist Party's Study Times journal said in October last year. "China is currently working with the U.S. to discuss bilateral investment agreements in order to access the 'national treatment before admission + Negative List' mode as the basis for negotiations, in line with TPP requirements," it said.

In other words, China is quitely negotiating with the United States to dilute some of the aspects of the TPP. This may be possible to some extent. But U.S. companies that are demanding higher market access in China are unlikely to agree to major changes without a fight.

====================================

FILE - A map illustrating China's silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road, or the so-called "One Belt, One Road" megaproject, is displayed at the Asian Financial Forum in Hong Kong, China Jan. 18, 2016.

CHINESE NEW SILKROADS

VS.

USA...TPP (TRANS-PACIFIC-PARTNERSHIP)

FILE - TPP Countries and Other Global Trade Agreements
 
SUAV/CHINA...TXOJ KEV NRHIAV NOJ HAUS MUS LAWM YAV TOMNTEJ
 
PIV TXWV RAU
 
MESKAS...TXOJ KEV NRHIAV NOJ HAUS MUS LAWM YAV TOM NTEJ
 
 
THAUM KAWG NWS KUJ YUAV TXIAS LOS MUS UA
1 QHOV KEV SIB TXEEB NOJ HAUS...
CES YEEJ YUAV MUAJ KEV TSIS SIB HAUM XEEB XWB XWB LI...

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Nuj Txeeg,

Ua Tsaug Koj Txoj kev Khwv Spent Time Tuaj Nyo Sawv Caj qwb Mob Tag  Rau Peb Tau Tuaj Nyeem /Twm.

Ib Qho Mas Koj Tias Suav Yuav Kav Ntiaj teb No,  Tab Sis Yog Suav Tau Kav Li Koj Tiag ces Peb Hmoob Yuav Nyob Nyuaj,

Vim Suav Nrhiav Tshuav Tua Hmoob Thiab Khawb Ntxa Xwb, Koj yeej Paub Lawm Tias Yog vim Li Cas Hmoob Thiaj Ua Ntxa Lawv Roob, Txawm Yog Suav Khawb Heev Heev, Hmoob Thiaj Muab Faus Lawv Roob Li Suav Kom Suav Tsis paub Thiaj Tsis kawb Xwb.   Hmoob Tiag Thaum Ub Yog Faus Ua Ntxa Tav Roob Nkaus xwb No Laiv, Tej laus Hais Na.

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http://cdn.newsday.com/polopoly_fs/1.11759337.1462352591!/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/display_600/image.jpg

For some reason,

China just sent a bunch of magicians and singers

to the South China Sea

China's military has dispatched ships and planes — even constructed new islands to assert its maritime claims.

Now it is deploying a new set of tools to uphold Chinese sovereignty: magicians, singers, and actors.

Famed singer of patriotic anthems Song Zuying headlined a tour of China's man-made islands in the South China Sea's Spratly islands this week, underscoring Beijing's confidence in asserting its increasingly dominant position in the disputed region.

The performance, titled "The People's Navy Advances," included songs, skits, and magic tricks, part of a long tradition of the People's Liberation Army art troops putting on shows to entertain, promote ideological conformity, and stir public pride in the military and ruling Communist Party.

Among the songs performed: "Ode to the South Sea Defenders," whose lyrics speak of "a troop of stout men with guns in their hands who battle the wind and fight the waves to guard the nation's door."

"On stilted platforms in the South Sea, (China's) five-starred red flag flaps in the wind, I've tasted all types of bitterness in the South Sea, (but) the people's happiness is my pride and glory," the song continues.

The singer Song, a star of the military arts troupe who once performed with Celine Dion on state television, was a big hit with the construction workers and naval officers who attended the shows, the official Xinhua News Agency reported. The event was also recorded for broadcast by the state-run CCTV.

"I was so excited for ... the troupe to come to the front-line islands," said Huang Tianjun, a member of the garrison atop Fiery Cross Reef. "We will most definitely hold fast here and defend every inch of the reef."

Along with the reef, known as Yongshu in Chinese, where China has constructed a runway capable of handling its largest military aircraft, the performers also visited smaller Cuarteron Reef. Alongside China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim territory in the area.

 

Photos of the performances that spread across state media on Wednesday offered a rare glimpse of the extensive work China has been carrying out in the area, showing lighthouses, harbors, and buildings all built atop coral reefs covered in sand and concrete.

In the background of some can be seen one of the navy's massive Type 071 amphibious dock ships capable of carrying four helicopters and as many as 800 troops.

Tensions have been rising in the area, in part because the US has refused to acknowledge China's newly built territories as enjoying the legal status of naturally occurring islands, with their accompanying territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.

Though it takes no formal stance on sovereignty claims, Washington has insisted on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and the Navy has sailed and flown past and over the new islands to drive home the point, prompting an angry response from Beijing.

 

===================================

 

2a0d0faef65640bfa11f9899b60e68aa.jpg

China seeks global support for

South China Sea policies...

 

CHRISTOPHER BODEEN,Associated Press Fri, May 6 12:14 AM PD

BEIJING (AP) — China is seeing mixed results in its effort to enlist friendly states in its push to exclude the U.S. and its allies from the festering South China Sea dispute, underscoring the limits of Chinese diplomacy despite its massive economic clout.

Beijing won a major endorsement for its position with remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last month that players from outside the region should not get involved.

However, its recent announcement of added support from Brunei, Laos and Cambodia drew unusually strong criticism from senior Singaporean diplomat Ong Keng Yong, who said Beijing may be trying to split the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the regional bloc to which all four nations belong. China's announcement was even questioned by Cambodian government spokesman Phay Siphan, who said no new agreement with China had been reached.

Despite the blow-back, China has noted recent statements that "show that the international community has come to understand and support the Chinese government's position on handling the South China Sea issue and the arbitration case brought by the Philippine side," Ouyang Yujing, the head of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, told reporters Friday.

Ouyang was referring to a case challenging China's South China Sea territorial claims brought by fellow claimant the Philippines before the United Nations Court of Arbitration in 2013. China has refused to join in the legal process and says it won't accept the court's ruling, expected within weeks.

Beijing's approach displays its craving for international respect and desire to avoid isolation over the issue, and provides "an iota of self-satisfaction," said Yu Maochun, an expert on Chinese politics at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Russia's support is particularly significant, both for China and the world at large, because of the growing appearance of an anti-U.S. and anti-Western united front, Yu said.

"This breeds a great potential danger of the world skidding to a formation of big power alliances of opposition, whereby China and Russia act together against a US.-led coalition of democracies," Yu said.

However, the fact China, with the world's second largest economy, has gained the vocal support of only a handful of largely undemocratic, economically dependent states also shows the limits of its push for greater diplomatic influence, said Jonathan Holslag, a professor of international politics at the Free University of Brussels.

"Actually, it is striking how small the number Chinese supporters remains, given the enormous amounts of financial aid that China threw into the scale," Holslag said. "It all shows the limits of China's economic diplomacy."

Although China has called repeatedly for outside states to stay neutral on the issue, it welcomes the expressions of support and sees no contradiction, said Li Guoqiang, a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher and top government adviser on the South China Sea.

Russia and others are "expressing a political stance, they are not interfering in South China Sea matters. On the other hand, other countries are substantively taking a whole series of actions," Li said at a Beijing forum on Tuesday.

The drive to enlist international backing comes as China faces growing scrutiny over its claim to virtually the entire South China Sea along with its reefs and islands.

The U.S. has kept up steady pressure, sending ships and planes to emphasize its rejection of China's assertion that the newly created islands it has built atop coral reefs are entitled to territorial waters and other legal rights.

Washington and its allies, including Japan, say the massive reclamation projects, complete with airstrips and military installations, raise tensions in a strategically vital waterway home to rich fishing grounds and a potential wealth of undersea gas and oil, and through which $5 trillion in global trade passes each year.

China has responded by accusing Washington of endangering peace and stability with its naval activities. On Friday, Beijing reaffirmed its sovereignty claim while issuing a new attack on the court case brought by Manila, calling it illegitimate and vowing never to "accept, participate in, or acknowledge" any subsequent rulings.

"The case brought by the Philippines is nothing but a political farce under the cloak of law," the Foreign Ministry's Ouyang, told reporters. "It is a grave threat to regional peace and stability."

The region could grow more tense if China begins reclamation work, as some speculate it might, on Scarborough Shoal, an uninhabited coral reef near the main Philippine island of Luzon that Chinese government vessels seized in 2012 following a tense standoff with Filipino ships.

China's Defense Ministry has not said whether such a plan exists, but has reiterated China's ownership and right to develop the shoal however it sees fit.

Asked about future developments, Ouyang merely reiterated an earlier government statement that all reclamationwork had concluded by the end of June last year.

"I believe you are very clear about the meaning of this remark," he said without elaborating.

==============================

 

http://cdn.newsday.com/polopoly_fs/1.11759337.1462352591!/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/display_600/image.jpg

 

TUB RO.G SUAV/CHINA

MUS TSIM COV FAKE/MAN MADE ISLANDS NYOB SOUTH CHINA SEA

LOS TAU LAWM 2-3 XYOOS NOV

KHO SIAB DHAU LAWM...YOG LI TSOOM FWV SUAV/CHINA

THIAJ LI TSO TUS NTXHAIS HMOOB SUAV NOV MUS HU NKAUJ & HAIS KWV TXHIAJ

RAU 1 TSOOM TUB RO.G SUAV/CHINA TAU UA KEV ZOO SIAB/LOM ZEM...

VIM TXOJ KEV MUS NYOB...RAU COV FAKE/MAN MADE ISLANDS NOV

YEEJ TSIS MUAJ XYOOB NTOO LI...TSIS MUAJ NEEG...TSIS MUAJ NAS NOOG...

TSUAS MUAJ DEJ HIAV TXWV & CUA TSHUAB NKAUS XWB...

ZAUB MOV NOJ LOS...TSHAIB TSHAIB NQHIS NQHIS MUAJ TSIS TXAUS NOJ...

TSUAS MUAJ TXOJ KEV KHWV TSIM/UA COV FAKE/MAN MADE ISLANDS

NOV NRUAB HNUB HMO NTUJ TAS MUS LI XWB...!

TSUAS UA LUB NEEJ NTSIA...NTUJ NTSUAB & NCO VAJ TSEV...

http://www.ezadar.hr/repository/image_raw/377802/large/

 

KHWV TAS NPAUD LOS KUJ TSEEM YUAV MAG MESKAS & COV NEEG SOUTHEAST

ASIANS/CHINA COV NEIGHBORS LOS TAWM TSAM THIAB XYOV HNUB TWG

TSEEM YUAV MAG MUS UA TSOV RO.G SIB NTAUS SIB TUA LI THIAB...

ZOO LI TEJ TUB R.OG SUAV/CHINA NOV YEEJ TSIS TAU LUB NEEJ ZOO UA KIAG LI...

NCAIM LAWV NIAM-TXIV...LAWV ZEJ ZOS TUAJ LAWM

XYOV TSEEM YUAV TUAG HNUB TWB YEEJ TSIS PAUB LI...

 

YOG LI NTAWD...THIAJ TSIM NYOG TAU KEV ZOO SIAB & LOM ZEM MES NTSIS

LOS NTAWM TUS NTXHAIS HMOOB SUAV/CHINA NOV LUB SUAB QAB ZIB KOM

COV TUB RO.G SUAV/CHINA HO UA TUS ZOO NPAU SUAV TIAS...

LAWV NIM TAU TXOJ KEV NYOB YWJ SIAB/FREEDOM LI NYOB HMOOB ZEJ ZOS

PEM ROOB...NYOB HMOOB TEB HMOOB CHAWS...

HAHAHA...

 

TAM SIM NOV SUAV/CHINA TAB TOM NRHIAV COV TEB LOS TUAJ NWS TOG

KOM NWS MUAJ SUAB LOJ/MUAJ CAI HAIS TIAS...

KEV MUS TXEEB DEJ...TXEEB AV...TXEEB HIAV TXWV...TXEEB NTSES...

TXEEB ROJ & TXEEB TEJ MINERALS NYOB RAU SOUTH CHINA SEA

TWB TSIS MUAJ TEEB MEEM VIM COV TEB CHAWS ZOO LI

LAOS...CAMBODIA...THIAB BRUNEI TWB TSIS HAIS/TSIS TAWM TSAM DAB TSI LI...

 

http://one-giant-step.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/map_of_laos-300x225.jpg.....http://www.newlife.org/images/blog/20110324/032511_2034_AGODCENTERE13.png

YOG KAWG...QHOV SUAV/CHINA TAU KEV SUPPORT LOS NTAWM

...LAOS & CAMBODIA...SAWV DAWS YEEJ PAUB ZOO TIAS TOS

2 LUB TEB CHAWS NOV HO KAM TUAJ SUAV/CHINA TOG LOS VIM NKAWD

TWB RAUG SUAV/CHINA MUAS TAU/BRIBES LAWV COV HLWB LOS LAWM NTEV...

THIAB 2 LUB TEB CHAWS NOV TXOM NYEM DHAU & TWB TAU THOV KHAWV

SUAV NYIAJ SIV LOS LAWM NTEV THIAB TSEEM YUAV THOV KHAWV

MUS NTXIV LAWM YAV TOM NTEJ...

 

http://www.travel-university.org/im/destinations/asia/brunei/brunei_loc.jpg

LUB TEB CHAWS...BRUNEI...YOG 1 LUB TEB CHAWS ME DHAU...

TXAWM NWS YUAV MUAJ TXI.AG NPLUA NUJ LAWM THIAB LOS

THAUM NWS XAV TXOG KEV YUAV CIAJ UA SUAV QHEV & KEV UA SUAV TUS PHOOJ YWG

QHOV TWG YUAV YOG QHOV ZOO DUA RAU NWS...

NWS THIAJ XUM UA SUAV TUS PHOOJ YWG...

VIM NWS LUB TEB CHAWS ME DHAU YEEJ TAWM TSAM TSIS YEEJ SUAV KIAG LI...

YOG LI NWS THIAJ TXIAV TXIM SIAB...TSA CHIJ DAWB THAUM NTXOV YOG QHOV ZOO...!

 

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http://1.im.guokr.com/mUkXJ2XvM4NGvhyjjmYb0chk16Bkv9D4iet3VcxCeLLOAQAAEQIAAFBO.png

The South China Sea showdown is going

to get nastier after an international court ruling...

Tensions have flared in the Asia-Pacific region just weeks before a key international court ruling on claims in the South China Sea, with nations growing increasingly embroiled in a war of words.

Beijing claims much of the South China Sea, putting it at odds with four other nations, along with Taiwan.

Manila wants the court to ­declare that Beijing’s claims must comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which both the Philippines and China are parties.

Beijing has refused to participate in the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and said it would not accept the decision, which could come this month or in June.

Washington has shown a determination to maintain what it calls freedom of navigation throughout the trade route, and US President Barack Obama has said his nation would hold China to account if Beijing chose to go against international rules and norms, without elaborating.

 

ouyang yujing south china sea

Ouyang Yujing, Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, listens to a question during a press briefing about China's South China Sea policies in Beijing, Friday, May 6, 2016.

 

China's backers

Beijing claims that more than a dozen nations in Asia, Europe and Africa have lent at least partial support to China’s argument that territorial disputes should be addressed solely by the nations directly involved, without interference from non-claimants. Topping the list of allies are Russia, India, Poland, Sudan, Pakistan, Belarus as well as rival claimant Brunei.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has taken a swipe at the process, with Ouyang Yujing, head of the department of boundary and ocean affairs, saying last week that the arbitration was nothing more than “a political farce in the guise of law”. Furthermore, the tribunal had put its impartiality at stake by agreeing to accept the case, despite Beijing’s opposition, Ouyang said.

State-controlled media have called the case a US-led ruse to fuel anti-Chinese sentiment and contain China. “The South China Sea issues are just an excuse for the US to meddle in regional affairs and stir up tensions in a bid to isolate China,” People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, said in a commentary on Friday.

Although it is uncertain how Beijing will respond to the ruling, one in Manila’s favor would deal a blow to China’s strategy for territorial claims in the region and set a precedent for rival claimants, analysts said. 

Dr Bonnie Glaser, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in the United States, said China’s effort to win diplomatic support was unlikely to succeed, even if Beijing used economic “carrots and sticks”. “The lesson is that China’s interests aren’t more important than other countries’ interests. Might doesn’t make right. Friends aren’t won through intimidation,” Glaser said.

Asean divided?

Although the 10-strong Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has steered clear of taking up regional sovereignty disputes, the issue indeed affects them directly.

Along with the Philippines, bloc members Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have overlapping claims with China. In a statement last month, Beijing said it had reached an agreement with Cambodia, Brunei and Laos that the dispute should be resolved through negotiations between parties directly concerned, and that it should not affect the ties between China and Asean.

But Cambodian government spokesman Phay Siphan was quoted by the Phnom Penh Post as saying that no new deal had been reached.

Professor Pang Zhongying, of Renmin University of China, cautioned against overestimating the backing. “Their influence is rather limited and they clearly traded their acquiescence for economic benefits,” Pang said.

Some Asean diplomats have lashed out at China for attempting to split the grouping, a charge China denies. Dr Daniel Wei Boon Chua, of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, warned of the consequence of a divided bloc. “Once Asean loses the plot in the South China Sea, we can expect ... claimants to go at each other,” he said.

Even state media has cautioned against over-optimism, noting that most of Beijing’s allies “do not necessarily support China’s sovereignty and territorial claims in the South China Sea completely”.

 

South China Sea

An aerial photo taken though a glass window of a Philippine military plane shows the alleged on-going land reclamation by China on mischief reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, west of Palawan, Philippines, May 11, 2015.

 

Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University, said China’s justification for its sovereignty, rooted in historical claims, were not popular with its neighbors, making it unlikely Beijing would win greater international support.

“There’s no denying that we basically are on our own in this fight in the South China Sea,” he said.

“Ties with our neighbors are important, but we have realized that without military might, we will not be able to win this battle in the South China Sea.

“That’s why there are growing signs that the current leadership has apparently given superior priority to strengthening hard power over the past three years and is unlikely to back down considering mounting international pressure,” Shi said.

Some analysts argue the inflammatory rhetoric coming out of Beijing was aimed largely at a domestic audience.

They note many governments, including China’s, have often sought to trump up nationalist fervor to divert the public’s attention away from larger political and economic concerns.

Other observers say the disputes offer a chance for China to re-examine its quest for greater influence largely through economic clout and checkbook diplomacy. Dr Jay Batongbacal, of University of the Philippines, said: “China is losing the battle in the court of international public opinion, but this is a situation largely of its own making.”

 

Ash Carter

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter speaks at a media briefing at the Pentagon in Washington, October 23, 2015.

 

Regional fallout

 

The arbitration was especially important to small states like Singapore which felt more secure when rules and norms were observed by major powers, said Chua, of Nanyang Technological University.

But “it would be foolish to think that the [court] ruling alone will give any sort of settlement to the disputes. There is a possibility that the ruling will not slow down China’s island-building projects at all,” he said.

Both Glaser and Professor Jerome Cohen, a leading expert on Chinese law at New York University school of law, said China’s rejection of a rule-based system made it look like a bully to the rest of the world. Referring to Beijing’s attacks on the tribunal, Cohen said: “Such attempts, of course, only further harm China’s quest for so-called soft power.” 

During a trip to Asia last year, US Defence Secretary Ash Carter lambasted Beijing for undermining security in Asia Pacific. He said the US was “deeply concerned” about the scale of China’s land reclamation, which has far exceeded all other claimants combined, and the prospect of further militarization of the islands, saying it would boost “the risk of miscalculation or conflict”.

According to the Pentagon, while other nations have also built outposts in the South China Sea, mostly before 2002, China has reclaimed more than 1,200 hectares of land in just two years.

Beijing argues the man-made islands and its military facilities offer civilian benefits.

 

Obama China

U.S. President Barack Obama faces a joint news conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington September 25, 2015.

Obama also singled out China recently, blaming Beijing for playing a zero-sum game with its neighbors.

“So with respect to the South China Sea, rather than operate under international norms and rules, their attitude is, ‘We’re the biggest kids around here. And we’re gonna push aside the Philippines or the Vietnamese.’ ... It’s not a zero-sum game,” Obama said in a TV interview late last month.

Echoing the US and the European Union, Hugo Swire, British minister of state responsible for East Asia, warned last month that China should respect the arbitration ruling, which must be binding on all parties.

China’s assertiveness had provided its neighbors with a clear and palpable threat, which may have played into Washington’s hands, according to Batongbacal. “Washington could not have done anything more effective to make Asean states come closer and welcome US involvement in the region than what China has done,” Batongbacal said.

He said the court ruling would also lend legal support to the US’ positioning in the region.

Where next?

Reflecting America’s rebalancing towards Asia, Obama hosted Asean leaders in the US for the first time in February.

He will follow that up this month with a visit to Vietnam and Japan for a Group of Seven summit, where regional territorial disputes are expected to be high on the agenda.

Chinese military experts have said Beijing might likely retaliate to the ruling by accelerating efforts to fortify the Scarborough Shoal, known as Huangyan Island in Chinese, which lies about 230km off the Philippine coast. Beijing could also possibly declare an air defence identification zone in the South China Sea, as it did in the East China Sea during an escalation of the row with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, or the Senkakus, in November 2013.

But Shi said the friction ­between China and the US and ­regional allies was likely to ­become the new normal in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Tensions may further escalate because, for Chinese leaders, their ultimate goal is to make its military strong enough to deny the US’ right to freedom of navigation and gradually squeeze all the rival claimants out of th South China Sea,” he said.

==============================

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-uWa1V0PWpRk/TwRX5MWTJoI/AAAAAAAAAVk/TVPDUYvUdMk/s500/Eagle_And_Dragon_by_vikingtattoo.jpg

https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/photo.goodreads.com/hostedimages/1451738450i/17592364.jpg

TEEB MEEM NYOB...SOUTH CHINA SEA

TSUAS MUAJ KUS YUAV KUB TSHAJ QUB NTXIV XWB...

 

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cf6bEyKWsAAoSJa.jpg

CITY OF HAGUE IN NETHERLANDS

 

http://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/staticmap?center=52.06385648683552,4.326620774932861&maptype=roadmap&zoom=12&size=336x300&markers=icon:http://images.unjobs.org/mapicon%7C52.06797214154116,4.35305662698363&key=AIzaSyC613EmwVhoCCZ4PkiflL4R9jj3E1s78Ek&sensor=false&visual_refresh=false

ICC...IN THE CITY OF HAGUE

 

http://alqabas.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9.jpg

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BUILDING...

 

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CaM4xx0WEAALyQ7.jpg

THESE ARE THE JUDGES...

( I THINK THESE JUDGES HAVE LIMITED TERM TO SERVE

AND THEN THERE WILL BE NEW ELECTION AGAIN...)

 

http://cdn.pmnewsnigeria.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/African-Union-session-504x310.jpg

INSIDE THE COURTROOM...

 

http://diasporaenligne.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/la-haye.jpg

IntlCrimCourt.jpg

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

or

ICC

IN HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

 

1. LUB 5-6 HLI NOV...INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT/ PERMANENT ARBITRATION COURT

nyob HAGUE, NETHERLANDS...YUAV TXIAV TXIM RAU CHINA & PHILIPPINE

TXOG ROOJ PLAUBNTUG NYOB...SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

2. COV TEB CHAWS XWS LI....INDIA, RUSSIA, POLAND, SUDAN, PAKISTAN, BELARUS...BRUNEI,

LAOS, CAMBODIA, POM ZOO TIAS...CIA CHINA, VIETNAM, PHILIPPINE, MALAYSIA, TAIWAN,

BRUNEI,...MAM SIB HAIS LAWV KOM MUAJ KEV HAUM XEEB...

 

Txhais tias...TSIS TAS YUAV MUS UA PLAUB NTUG TXOG...INERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT...

 

3. COV TEB CHAWS UAS HAIS TIAS...YOG INTERNATIONAL TXIAV TXIM POM ZOO LI CAS

LAWM LAWV KUJ YUAV YUAV RAWS LI NTAWD...

YOG PHILIPPINE, USA, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, VIETNAM...

TAB SIS PAB NOV...ORIGINALLY LAWV YEEJ TSIS LEES YUAV QHOV CHINA TUAJ

NAM TEJ CIAM DEJ & TXEEB YUAV LUAG TAS...COV ISLANDS

NYOB SOUTH CHINA SEA...

LAWV XAV KOM TXHUA LUB TEB CHAWS ROV MUS NYOB LI YAV NRAM NTEJ

UAS SAWV DAWS TSIS TAU SIB TXEEB COV ISLANDS NOV...

TXHAIS TIAS...COV ISLANDS NOV ZE LEEJ TWG CES LUB TEB CHAWS NTAWD MUAJ CAI

MUS NRHIAV NOJ NYOB NTAWD...TAB SIS KUJ TSIS TAU TXWV TXIAV LWM LUB

TEB CHAWS UAS KUJ NYOB TSIS DEB TSIS ZE KOM UA TAU TIB YAM...

 

TXHAIS TIAS...SIB SHARE...YOG THAUM TWG HO MUAJ TEEB MEEM

LOS SAWV DAWS MAM KHO KOM HAUM XEEB XWB...

 

4. INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS FEEM NTAU POM TIAS CHINA UA TSIS YOG LAWM...

VIM NWS TIB LUB TEB CHAWS XWB YUAV CIA LI KAV/TXEEB YUAV LUAG TAS

SOUTH CHINA SEA LI LAWM...YAM TSIS MUAJ KEV NCAJ NCEES RAU COV TEB CHAWS UAS

YEEJ IB TXWM NYOB ZE DUA & YOG LAWV QUB CHAW NRHIAV NOJ HAUS YAV TAS LOS Li...

 

5. COV TEBCHAWS FEEM COOB NTSEEG TIAS...ICC...YUAV TSIS PUB CHINA UA YWJ NWS SIAB...

 

6. YOG TIAS CHINA SWB ROOJ PLAUB NOV CHINA YUAV TSIS MLOOG TXOJ CAI HLO VIM CHINA

TWB YEEJ IB TXWM TSIS KAM MUS KOOM ROOJ PLAUB NOV...

THAUM CHINA SWB LAWM CES CHINA YUAV CIA LI TXEEB KIAG COV ISLANDS UA TSEEM SEEM

NTXIV KIAG THIAB XWB...UA NEEG TSIS YUAV CAI LI NTAG...

 

7. YOG THAUM ZOO LI NOV LAWM...COV TEBCHAWS XWS LI...MESKAS THIAB PHILIPPINE YUAV

MUAB TXOJ CAI NTAWM ROOJ PLAUB NTUG NOV LOS TUAJ NWS TOG CES KEV UA TSOV RO.G

YUAV TSHWM SIM TUAJ XWB...

 

http://www.almustaqbal.com/UploadedImages/255615.jpg

 

FLAG OF NETHERLANDS...

 

 

http://www.modenatravel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Holandija-3.jpg

TEBCHAWS...NETHERLANDS YOG 1 LUB TEBCHAWS

UAS MUAJ COV...WINDMILLS...LI NOV NTAU TSHAJ PLAWS...

 

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The Chinese Navy Is Behind America

in One Key Area (But Not For Long)

The National Interest

By 

Fri, May 13 1:00 AM PDT

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has no recent combat experience and no hope of challenging the U.S. Navy on a global scale. The U.S. Navy outnumbers and outclasses China’s sailing branch in practically every category — not just technologically.

America’s sailors are better trained and have far more practical experience, giving an edge in the event of a future conflict.

But that’s not the whole story. Beijing is slowly and steadily improving how it trains its sailors and how it conducts naval exercises — even putting its people at greater risk than the U.S. Navy— and reforming a stodgy, top-down method structure that inhibits captains’ initiative.

In other words, China is pushing hard to get better at preparing for war. This is worrying for the United States, which already faces the possibility of defeat or stalemate in a limited, regional conflict with China.

That thesis is central to a recent article by U.S. Navy Capt. Dale Rielage in Proceedings, the influential journal of the U.S. Naval Institute. As the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s director of intelligence, Rielage knows a thing or two about the Chinese military.

The past decade has “seen a major improvement in the scope and complexity of PLAN training that has paralleled the expansion in its missions, operations, and capabilities,” Rielage wrote. “Central to these are high-end naval combat tasks — the fundamentals of fleet action against a foreign navy intervening against People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests. While no training is a perfect facsimile of combat, the PLAN’s proficiency is increasing through this deliberate investment in more advanced and realistic training.”

There is an enormous caveat to this claim, which Rielage is ready to admit. While China can count on new equipment, warships and weapons, how it will deploy them if a shooting war breaks out is far less obvious.

A single vessel, let alone a fleet, is a complicated machine staffed by hundreds or thousands of human beings … who are prone to biases and making mistakes. Wars are inherently confusing and unpredictable — which is why militaries rely on time-tested tactics and procedures to know what to do in actual combat.

 

Navies, perhaps more than other services, take decades — at minimum — to physically build and mold into a credible force. And when it comes to tactics, China indeed lags behind the United States.

For instance, Chinese commanders often create techniques “on the fly” when learning new technologies, Rielage wrote. Chinese officers often have modern command-and-control systems — thanks to Beijing’s big defense budget — but find them so overwhelming they resort back to older and less efficient methods.

“Chinese military writers frequently criticize ‘formalism’ in training and ‘training for show’ as undermining the value of exercises,” retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Dennis Blasko wrote in a 2015 article for War on the Rocks. “Despite the progress that the PLA has made in these efforts, the PLA leadership is aware of the force’s continuing shortcomings in training.”

But China is improving. According to Rielage, Beijing is now more often deploys warships as “opposition” forces in exercises. There is now greater emphasis on live-fire exercises, and exercises where a military unit will start out blind as to its adversaries’ numbers and capabilities.

To be sure, the U.S. Navy practices similar techniques all the time, but that’s because the U.S. Navy is a professional, war-ready military force. What Beijing is doing is not revolutionary, but necessary if it wants to challenge America at sea. China is also placing extra of emphasis on training for electromagnetic warfare — jamming radars, radios and satellite-guided systems … and defending against the same.

“In these [Chinese military news] accounts, communications fail and radars are jammed at key moments. The praiseworthy Red [friendly] force responds and overcomes these attacks, or at the least, emerges more capable of surmounting them in the future.”

“The clear impression is that the PLAN is more willing to accept risk in its training evolutions than its U.S. counterparts,” Rielage noted. “This mindset builds realism but will likely carry a cost in both equipment and personnel.”

The key difference is that the U.S. Navy has far more experience in training and in real warfare. It’s possible China putting a greater priority on realism will give it an edge, or at least match the United States. It’s possible Beijing will solve some of its problems adjusting to modern command-and-control systems. But we will never know unless there is an actual war.

Let’s hope we never find out.

==============================

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25741c5d79c6ba2b73d7a4d992934f9a

YOG MUAJ KEV SIB TUA TIAG NYOB RAU SOUTH CHINA SEA NO

MESKAS & CHINA...LEEJ TWG YUAV MUAJ TXOJ KEV YEEJ DUA...?

 

CIA PEB MAM SOJ NTSUAM MUS LI NRAM NOV...

 

http://www.iaireview.org/public/Articoli/13488421987866.jpg

CHINA

1. CHINA MUAJ NEW MILITARY WEAPONS...TAB SIS NWS COV TUB RO.G PUAS

TAU YOG...EXPERT...TXAWJ SIV...?

( KEV TRAINING SIV TEJ NEW WEAPONS NOV YEEJ TSEEM TSIS TAU TXAUS...)

 

2. CHINA TEJ NEW WEAPONS NOV NE PUAS TAU PIV TAU/PUAS TAU NROG MESKAS

SIB TXIG...?

( TXAWM TIAS...CHINA MUAJ TEJ NEW WEAPONS ZOO DUA QUB LAWM LOS

YEEJ TSEEM CAUM TSIS TAU MESKAS QAB...ZOO TSIS CUAG MESKAS LI...)

 

3. CHINA COV TUB RO.G PUAS TAU MUAJ ...REAL LIFE EXPERIENCE...RAU TXOJ KEV

UA TSOV puv TIAG TIAG...?

( CHINA...YEEJ TSIS TAU MUAJ 1 NTHW TSOV RO.G LOJ NYOB TWG LI TXIJ THAUM

CHINA TAU TXIA UA COMMUNIST LOS...EXCEPT QHOV NYUAG TSOV puv ME ME

UA NROG NYAB LAJ RAU XYOO 1979 XWB...)

 

4. CHINA TAB TOM MUAJ KEV KUB NTXHOV NYOB RAU AV LOJ XWS LI ...

XI JINPING...TAU MUAB COV TUB RO.G LOJ (GENRALS) COOB TUS TSHEM TAWM

HAUJ LWM THIAB MUAJ HLOOV CHAW RAU UB NOV NTAU...UA RAU LAWV TSIS

TSHUA TXAUS SIAB RAU...XI JINPING...( INTERNAL CONFLICT...)

 

5. CHINA TUS ECONOMY TAM SIM NOV NWS...SLOW DOWN... LI LAWM THAUM MUAJ

TSOV RO.G TUAJ TIAG...YUAV SIV NYIAJ NTAU HEEV LI...YOG CHINA TUS

ECONMY TSIS ZOO...TSIS RUAJ KHOV TIAG YUAV UA TSOV RO.G MUS TSIS

TAU NTEV...

----------------------------------------------------

http://www.ooyuz.com/images/2015/8/26/1443266048754.jpg

USA/MESKAS

1. TUB RO.G MESKAS PAUB SIV TEJ WEAPONS LAWV MUAJ ZOO DUA CHINA...

 

2. MESKAS COV WEAPONS YEEJ TSEEM ZOO DUA CHINA LI...

 

3. TUB RO.G MESKAS TAU MUAJ REAL EXPERIENCE RAU KEV UA TSOV RO.G

NTAU DUA CHINA...

 

4. MESKAS...LUB ZOG YUAV TSIS TSHUA TXAUS YOG MESKAS MUAJ 2 NTHWV

TSOV RO.G UA KE RAU TIB LUB SIJ HAWM...

( QHOV NOV...POSSIBLE...VIM MESKAS TAB TOM MUAJ TEEB MEEM NROG

RUSSIA NYOB RAU...EAST EUROPE...NROG RUSSIA...)

 

5. MESKAS...TAB TOM MUAJ IB COV ...NEW WEAPONS...MESKAS TAB TOM

XAV MUAB TAWM LOS SIV RAU TOM TSHAV RO.G SEB YUAV ZOO NPAUM

LI CAS...

 

IN CONCLUSION

YOG MUAJ KEV SIB NTAUS SIB TUA TIAG

MESKAS MUAJ ...PERCENTAGE...TIAS YUAV YEEJ DUA...

VIM MESKAS YEEJ PAUB LI NOV...MESKAS THIAJ KAM MUS TXHEEM

COV TEB CHAWS ME NYOB SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

http://www.anandabazar.com/polopoly_fs/1.297902.1454243405!/image/image.jpg

http://i.kinja-img.com/gawker-media/image/upload/s--8OZvScOU--/18d3t8mfqoly1jpg.jpg

 

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OIB OIB OIB...

SAWV DAWS XAV SIB TUA DHAU LAWM

KAV TSIJ SIB TUA TSAWG TSUAG

THAUM LAWV TUAG TAS LAWM CES

 

HMOOB TEB CHAWS CIA LI MUS YUAV TEJ AV

UAS NEEG TUAG TAS TSIS MUAJ NEEG NYOB

LOS UA HMOOB TUG LAWM XWB MAS...

 

LI NOV THIAJ YOG NKAUS LI XEEB & STEVE HAIS NA...

NYOB NYOB NTUJ CIA LI FEEB TEBCHAWS

LOS RAU HMOOB YUAV LAWM XWB...

 

Hahaha...

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XAV XAV POM LAWV TEJ TXUJ CI UA TSOV R.OG TSHIAB NO HEEV LI...

XAV KOM LAWV SIB TUA TSAWG TSUA ES THIAJ PAUB TIAS

LEEJ TWG ...HEEV TSHAJ...!

 

3-HMOOB TAIS CAUS DHAU LAWM

CIA LAWV SAWV LOS UA TXIV RAU PEB NTSIA XWB

TXAUS LAWM OS...

 

Hahaha...

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America, China, India and Japan:

Headed Towards a South China Sea Showdown?

By 

Recent months have seen a continuing increase in military activities in the South China Sea, particularly by the United States and China, but also by ‘bit players’ like India and Japan. These activities only serve to heighten tensions in the region at a time when the priority should be to demilitarize the area.

In the most recent serious incident, on May 17, two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a US Navy EP-3 intelligence and surveillance aircraft about 50 nautical miles east of Hainan Island. This incident could have violated agreed upon procedures between the United States and China to manage such encounters. It follows earlier incidents when Chinese jet fighters intercepted US P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft over the South China and Yellow seas.

The United States recently conducted its third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea since China started its extensive land reclamation and building of airfields and support facilities on reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. The latest FONOP involved a US warship sailing close by the disputed Fiery Cross Reef. In March, the United States sent a small fleet of warships — comprising aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, two destroyers, two cruisers and a Japan-based US Seventh Fleet flagship — into contested waters to counter the presence of China.

During his recent visit to Vietnam, President Barack Obama announced that the United States would be lifting its longstanding ban on sale[quote]s of lethal military equipment to Vietnam. This has been construed as part of a strategy to help Vietnam defend itself against an increasing threat from China in the South China Sea. In return, Vietnam might grant the United States access to the strategic Cam Ranh Bay military base. Along with access to bases in Palawan in the Philippines, this would markedly enhance America’s ability to project military power into the South China Sea.

Lyle Goldstein from the US Naval War College sugg[quote]ests in his recent book Meeting China Halfway that rather than enhancing US military engagement with Vietnam, Washington should be ending it, arguing that “recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation.” Unfortunately, moderation has not been evident in any recent developments in the South China Sea.

 

What is significant about recent American naval activities in the region is that Washington has chosen to announce them with a blaze of publicity. This sugg[quote]ests a clear intention to confront China and to show the world that the United States is doing so.

India added to tensions recently when it sent a force of four naval vessels into the South China Sea for a two-and-a-half-month-long deployment, which includes participation in Exercise Malabar off Okinawa, jointly with the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Predictably, Beijing reacted strongly to this naval deployment, saying that New Delhi should not encourage Tokyo and Washington to bring added tensions to the region.

Meanwhile a Chinese strike group of three guided missile destroyers, two frigates and a supply ship, in addition to a submarine and aircraft carrier, have been conducting exercises in the South China Sea. This group patrolled off Chinese-controlled reefs in the Spratly Islands, including Fiery Cross Reef, only a day before the American FONOP near that reef.

All this is looking like dangerous brinkmanship. All the major powers in the South China Sea are trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the edge of active conflict.

Anyone who knows China and its history will know that China will go to the brink. But it will not be China that actually goes over the brink. It’s much more likely to be one of the countries taking China to the brink that does so. China, with a ‘home ground’ advantage and numerous military and civil assets in the region, can readily create a situation where one of the other parties will be forced to fire the first shot or to back down. Hopefully, though, current rules of engagement won’t allow a first shot to be fired. But we can’t be sure of that.

Significantly, the countries that are taking China to the brink are extra-regional players with often overstated interests in the South China Sea. They are ‘burning their boats behind them’, with nowhere to go other than to back down or fire the ‘first shot’. They have no concept of an end game other than compelling China to back down and follow their ‘rule of law’. But that is not going to happen.

The sad reality is that all this brinkmanship is adding to the strategic distrust that pervades the region at present.

Unfortunately, no existing regional forum has been prepared so far to address the implications of greater military activity in the South China Sea and the increased tensions that result. The sovereignty disputes currently attract greater attention. This obsession with sovereignty leads to a situation where sovereignty is not just an obstacle to effective management of the South China Sea and activities within it, but also to any preparedness to address measures to demilitarize the sea.

Demilitarising the South China Sea should be an objective of all stakeholders. To this end, China should clarify its claims in the South China Sea and refrain from activities that might be seen as assertive or aggressive. Japan and India should moderate their activities, and the United States should step back from its current naval initiatives, including by not undertaking provocative FONOPs. These prominent players in the South China Sea should all back off from their current military activities, lest the region continue down a track that could lead to more serious incidents and even conflict.

This piece first appeared in East Asia Forum here.

==============================

http://www.china-family-adventure.com/image-files/physical-map-of-china.jpg

 

I WOULD SUPPORT CHINA TO BE

A HEGEMONIC POWER IN ASIA....

IF CHINA ACTS MORE LIKE

A BIG BROTHER RATHER THAN A BIG BULLY...

 

BUT FROM I'VE HAVE SEEN CURRENTLY

CHINA ACTS MORE LIKE A BIG BULLY TO ITS OWN NEIGHBORS...

THEREFORE, CHINA CAN NOT BE A SUPER POWER NATION

UNLESS IT LEARNS ITS LESSON

NOT TO BE A BIG BULLY TO ITS SMALL NEIGHBORS...

ITS SHOULD LEARN TO BE

A BIG BROTHER AND A PROTECTOR

TO BRING PEACE & PROSPERITY

TO ITS SMALL NEIGHBORS

INSTEAD OF PAINS & SUFFERING & CHAOS...!

 

CHINA NEEDS NOT JUST ACTS ON ITS OWN NATIONAL

INTERESTS BUT ALSO THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS,

ESPECIALLY, ITS NEIGHBORS IN ASIA...!

 

LET TIBET BE INDEPENDENCE

&

BE SELF DETERMINATION...

LEAVE SOUTH CHINA SEA AS IT WAS IN THE PAST...

LET IT BE THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ZONES

TO ALL NEIGHBORS...

 

IF THERE WILL BE AN ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT

FOR THE BENEFITS OF ALL NATIONS INVOLVED

THEN LET'S HAVE THEIR CONSENSUS...

BE DEMOCRACY & LET THE MAJORITY RULE...!

 

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CHINA'S ONE ROAD...ONE BELT STRATEGY...

 

China's Quest for Global Dominance:

Reality or Myth

 

“It has been China’s dream for a century to become the world’s leading nation,” wrote Liu Mingfu, then a colonel in the People’s Liberation Army, in his 2010 book The China Dream. After taking over as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, Xi Jinping echoed the book’s language and one of its key themes—“the dream of a strong military”—repeatedly in speeches. This dream, he said, would be realized by 2049, a century after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

The English translation of The China Dream was published in the United States in May, the same month that the Chinese government published a defense-policy white paper laying out an expanded role for the navy in the context of U.S.-China tensions over China’s construction of islands in disputed waters in the South China Sea. The U.S. government estimates that Beijing has created 2,000 acres of artificial land in the Spratly Islands, parts of which are also claimed by other nearby countries. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter warned over the weekend that China’s activity heightened the risk of conflict in the region; a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman responded that the construction was “legal, reasonable … and neither impacts nor targets any country.”

The United States has its China hawks, and Liu is essentially an America hawk within China. After the initial publication of Liu’s book, Phillip C. Saunders of the U.S. National Defense University called it a “sensationalist” tract “aimed at tapping into a profitable mass market ... rather than [promoting] political orthodoxy,” and the book appears to have put its publisher briefly at odds with the government. The Wall Street Journal reported that The China Dream “flew off the shelves but was pulled over concerns it could damage relations with the U.S.” In the Xi era, however, the Journal’s Jeremy Page spotted it in the “recommended books” section of a state-run bookstore. (Liu told Page he didn’t know whether Xi himself had read it, but said Xi’s “China Dream” speeches had sent “a strong message.”)

Liu is representative of a new class of pundits in China that former Financial Times Beijing bureau chief Geoff Dyer has compared to America’s “TV generals,” retired officers who opine on military matters in the media. “In the last few years,” Dyer wrote in his book The Contest of the Century, “something similar has happened in China. A small number of media-friendly members of the armed forces have begun to talk openly about military matters, including their mistrust of and distaste for the U.S. military and its policies in Asia. ... In some ways, Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu is the latest addition to their numbers.”

The colonel has now retired from the military, and the path to global dominance he laid out five years ago was a bit more flexible than Xi’s; Liu reckoned it might take China another five decades to replace the United States as world leader. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has called the book an example of a “triumphalist” strain in Chinese thinking, which argues that “no matter how much China commits itself to a ‘peaceful rise,’ conflict is inherent in U.S.-China relations.” Kissinger noted that the hawks’ vision of inevitable U.S.-China conflict hasn’t been endorsed by either the Chinese or the American governments, but that “if the assumptions of these views were applied by either side—and it would only take one side to make it unavoidable—China and the U.S. could easily fall into an escalating tension.”

What follows is a condensed excerpt of one Chinese hawk’s view of what the “China Age” will look like, and his roadmap for how China will get there. It outlines a vision of Chinese superiority informed by the experience of America’s own rise to superpower status and conduct as the world’s preeminent power. His descriptions are general, and his prescriptions vague, but he asserts that the Chinese century will be a democratic one. If this strikes Americans as incongruous given China’s domestic system, Liu’s contention is that America itself is only “half democratic”—electing its leaders at home but “autocratic in the world.” He continues: “Americans overrate themselves and evaluate themselves untruthfully by saying that they are a democratic country.” And it is China that in Liu’s view can provide the “checks and balances” against America necessary to “form a democratic world.”

—Kathy Gilsinan


The appearance of every champion nation begins a new era. The China Age, at its most basic, will be an age of prosperity. In [early Chinese revolutionary] Sun Yat-sen’s evaluation of the West’s conception of Yellow Peril, he said that in the future, China’s era would not be one of Yellow Peril, but of Yellow Favor. The China Age will not be one in which China threatens the world, it will be one in which China enriches the world.

China Must Learn From America

America’s GDP surpassed Great Britain’s in 1895 to become the world’s largest. [Editor’s note: OECD estimates show U.S. per-capita GDP overtaking that of the United Kingdom sometime in the 1890s.] But it was only after 1945, half a century after America’s GDP outpaced Great Britain’s, that the United States replaced Great Britain as world leader. China’s GDP is still smaller than America’s; it may take China 50 years to overtake America’s GDP and replace it as world leader. There is still no need for America to be nervous. China should not be in a rush to be a leader; it should allow America to keep the position until a time that is best for all sides.

 

Before China can take over as world leader in the 21st century, it will need half a century to work through three stages. The first will be catching up to America and actively taking a leading role where it can in the world; the second will be racing neck-and-neck with America, and leading the world as an equal partner with America; and the third stage will be guiding the world through exercising leadership and management in the world, and thereby becoming the world’s leading nation. China is already actively participating in leadership where it can, and moving toward becoming America’s equal. This stage will last for another 20 to 30 years.

In 1987, American history professor Paul Kennedy of Yale University researched the favorable and adverse conditions surrounding China’s rise. He pointed out that China was the poorest of the countries wishing to be a great power and occupied the worst strategic position. These, he said, were two adverse conditions that would limit China’s rise, but he also pointed out two favorable conditions: one was that China’s leaders had “an ambitious, coherent, and visionary strategy, one that could beat Moscow, Washington, and Tokyo, not to mention Western Europe”; the other was that “China would continue to develop economically, and could be a vastly different country within several decades.”

His analysis of China’s strategy was very accurate. China’s rise was, before all else, the rise of its strategy.

The Three Phases of Chinese Strategy

The grand strategy of 21st-century China has to answer three questions: What kind of a China should we build? What kind of an Asia should we build? And what kind of a world should we build?

What Kind of China Should Be Built?

Mao Zedong led the construction of a socialist China; Deng Xiaoping led the construction of a China built on socialism with Chinese characteristics. Both were strategic designs and systems for a different kind of China.

China’s rise and revival cannot be limited to a strictly economic rise, and China’s role as a great power cannot be limited to a major economic role. Those who think China’s rise is not an ideological and military rise, or who think China’s rise is just an economic rise, and that China is only rising to become an economic power or a GDP power, are making a strategic mistake. A rich nation without a strong military is an insecure power. A nation without technological innovation is a country that can’t produce a scientific rise, and in an era where the knowledge economy is the most productive force, it is a country that can’t be strong economically. If China limits its rise to purely economic goals, it will produce a hobbled global power, a kind of global power that doesn’t last. To create a nation like that would be equivalent to cutting short China’s rise and the revival of the Chinese people.

 

What Kind of Asia Should Be Built?

To lead the world, China first needs to lead Asia. More than half the world’s population lives in Asia, six of the world’s 10 largest countries [by population] are in Asia, and 30 percent of global exports originate in Asia. Kissinger believes that the global system is undergoing a fundamental change; the center of the world is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific. One could say that Asia is the region with the most vitality and potential in the 21st century. The kind of Asia we build will be critical in deciding what kind of world we build. After the Second World War, Europeans’ strategic plans and designs for the continent were a success. The success of the European Union today is strong proof of that.

The era of the Warring States in Europe has come to a close. The conflict of the past has become an alliance, one that shows great strength and potential on the world stage. But Asia’s Warring States era has just begun, and today China, Japan, and India are acting out the Wars of the Three Kingdoms over the entire continent. In Asia, it’s not just one or two countries that want to control the continent’s destiny. India’s politicians declared long ago that the 21st century will belong to India. In answer to the question of what kind of Europe to build and how to build it, Europeans have already produced a grand European strategy, and putting that strategy into practice, they have produced remarkable achievements. Asia needs to look to the European Union for experience, but there is no possibility of copying the European model. The building of Asia will take Asian wisdom and innovation. And in the creation of Asian goals, an Asian model, Asian methods, and Asian strategies, China will serve a unique role.

What Kind of World Should Be Built?

What kind of a China does the world need, and what kind of a world does China need? These questions are closely linked. At its highest levels, China’s grand strategy is its overall, long-term design for the world. If China is to guide and lead the world, it needs to have a plan and a design for it.

 

The conclusion of the Cold War was a fantastic opportunity to create a better world order, but instead the United States embarked down the path of unilateralism and hegemony. Joseph Nye, [an] American political scientist and Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government professor, has argued that the principle of a world power is that it cannot just seek its own interests; it needs to seek methods that benefit its own interests as well as the interests of others. The ideal world power should have a wide view of its national interests. The ideal world power looks at the international system in a broader context, and rather than only serving its national interests, also serves other national interests. In this, China is more suited to lead the world and rebuild the world order than America.

French politician Georges Clemençeau said, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” Charles de Gaulle said, “Politics is too important to be left to the politicians.” A Chinese expert said, “The world is too important to be left to America. China needs to ‘design the world.’ China must lead the world toward a better future.” As a designer, China needs to produce a better blueprint for the world than America’s. As a world leader, China needs to produce a better policy agenda than America’s. China has said it wants to build a harmonious world, and this is what China’s design for the world offers.

The Secret to a Slow Rise: Hiding Power and Biding Time

One of the skills demonstrated in America’s rise is a special American ability to bide its time. Even with the capacity to lead the world, America does not rush to take the lead. [The period from] 1913–1945 was a turning point in world history, and in the history of America’s global role. Europe, once the center of international relations whose influence swayed even America, lost its global hegemony after World War I. All signs after 1917 pointed to the rise of America as the world’s new leader, and even when it didn’t use its full military strength (during the 1920s), it provided economic and cultural resources that defined and maintained the world order. The period in the 1930s when the United States shirked its power as leader at every level, withdrew from the international order, and retreated into nationalism and unilateralism was truly an exception, but even then, in the words of Joseph Nye, it was obvious that the United States was “doomed to leadership.”

 

On the eve of victory in World War II, [U.S. President Franklin] Roosevelt and his colleagues expected the United States to rise from the war and enter the world as the most powerful nation. And unlike after the First World War, they were determined to lead the world after this war. This time, they would create a world order that promoted American interests, and they would use it not only to increase American wealth and power, but also to spread American values to every corner of the world.

A Powerful China in the 21st Century

Only by becoming a military power can China effectively maintain its security as a market power and have the dignity of a civilized country, and have the power and conditions to play a constructive role in the international community and become a responsible big country. [Former Chinese leader] Deng Xiaoping pointed out that China is now a strength that maintains world peace and stability, not a destructive force; the more powerful China becomes, the more reliable world peace will be. The powerfulness of China is not only in the need for China’s security and development, but also the need for world peace.

After the founding of the United States, a debate was conducted on whether a strong army should be established or not. Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist leader, said: “If we want to become a commercial nation, or to maintain safety in the Atlantic, we must make effort to set up a Navy as soon as possible.” This debate reached an agreement after the second war between the United Kingdom and the United States. In the early days of the founding, the consistent understanding of U.S. military strategy and national-security strategy was to rapidly develop the economic and military strength of the U.S., and to build a powerful navy and army to protect the security and commercial interests of the United States. Meanwhile, [the country] pursued a policy of isolationism in international affairs and kept a low profile. The United States still built a strong military force even though it pursued the policy of isolationism, and the United States still built a strong navy even though it wanted to be a commercial nation.

 

Russia now claims that it has developed a unique strategic missile system with the capacity of orbital transfer that could break through any missile-defense system. Russia also planned to build five strategic nuclear submarines in 2015. It is said that Putin said that Russia “would build a new generation of nuclear submarines even if the Kremlin has to be sold.” In the 21st century, the construction of “a powerful China” is not only to build China into a “market power,” but also to make China a “military power.” If a country is only strong and large in the market, but weak and small on the battlefield, it will be the prey of strong powers.

Latin author Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus famously said: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” This sentence has been regarded as wisdom by Western realists in international relations for the entire modern era. This echoes the ancient Chinese book The Methods of the Sima, which says that although the world is safe now, forgetting war will be dangerous. By applying these sage words, contemporary Chinese believe that to realize a peaceful rise, the military must rise. To realize peace, prepare for war.

Peace has different historical forms. The international community in the 19th century had peace under the rule of the British Empire. Peace in the latter half of the 20th century saw the emergence of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, a cold peace under the threat of nuclear war. World peace after the Cold War has been a peace under American hegemony. The world in the 21st century needs peace with multipolar balance, and China in the 21st century needs a peace that can protect its development and rise. Such peace cannot be obtained relying on the friendliness of other powers, nor reliance on showing weakness and keeping a low profile. Such peace can only be gained through courage and strength.

A Chinese army ensures there will be no U.S. aggression. A Chinese army will not launch wars; it is actually the fundamental guarantee for preventing wars. A country needs checks and balances of political power, so that the nation can become a democracy. International society likewise needs checks and balances to be able to form a democratic world. China must have the ability to destroy the United States’ ability in order to ensure consistency, coexistence, common security, and common development.

 

For the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, one of the most critical factors was that both nations had the ability to obliterate each other—this mutually-assured-destruction capability ensured the coexistence of these two countries. For the 21st century in China, with the United States in strategic competition, if China is unable to threaten the U.S., it would be difficult to get a decent, just peace; it would be difficult to enjoy dignified joint rights of survival and development.

For China’s military rise, there should be a powerful military force able to effectively maintain and achieve national unity, and control and crack down on separatist forces. It must be an effective force in the Taiwan Strait to counter U.S. military intervention, which would deter the United States from supporting Taiwanese independence with force. The goal of China’s military rise is to make the United States unable to afford to contain China. With this military rise, China will be able to prosper without being peacefully contained by the U.S., and will also be able to contain the U.S. China’s military strength has to be more powerful than any rivals in the world to the degree and level that no nation can contain China’s rise. No country shall set a ceiling for China’s power.

 

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China and Russia Are No Match for World Order

By   

This year’s G7 summit in Ise-shima, Japan was full of spectacles worthy of arresting headlines, including U.S. President Barack Obama’s historic embrace of atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima on May 27th. Prime Minister Abe as host has enjoyed a considerable boost for his efforts as host and now is confidently heading into an upper house election on July 10th. Like most international summits, however, what lies beyond the headlines are the agreements made among leaders even if not declared in the moment. Much of what the G7 leaders was focused on was the creation of a joint approach to the global rise of revisionism led by China and Russia, who resent not being part of the gathering. The most consequential outcome of the two-day event on Japan’s idyllic island was the emergence of a new phase in the ongoing Sino-Japanese geoeconomic competition. It characterizes a global trend for the world’s leading liberal economies for years to come.

Nationalist-driven and aggressive foreign policy is ubiquitous among authoritarian regimes. China and Russia in particular have been challenging the status quo by displays of military force in Crimea and the South China Sea. Despite regional apprehension and American warnings, the Chinese representative at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue warned  that in the South China Sea, “We do not make trouble but we have no fear of trouble.” While divergent objectives guide such self-aggrandizing behavior, Beijing and Moscow make strange bedfellows under one common goal: to create a new geopolitical reality in opposition to the current liberal world order.

This emerging geopolitical trajectory is particularly evident in recent global geoeconomics increasingly dominated by Beijing's $8 trillion One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. This grand economic project revolves around major investment projects to purportedly promote global connectivity. In reality, however, OBOR is Beijing’s commercial-military scheme designed to advance its great power status while generating jobs overseas for the country’s surplus labor. Therefore it has a peculiar focus on investment in strategic projects despite questionable feasibility, including the floundering $5.5 billion Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway traversing Indonesia, a country crucial to China’s geostrategy for staking claims in the South China Sea.

Despite the dubious economic outlook for OBOR, China looks to pursue its global geoeconomic agenda in earnest by attracting multilateral investment in its $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As a result, Beijing has been literally buy[quote]ing up space in the world’s key geostrategic locations from Djibouti to Nicaragua. Paradoxically, the significance of OBOR is not China’s self-aggrandizing expansion of its geopolitical influence under the veneer of economic cooperation. Rather, the significance lies in the absence of a solid response from liberal countries countering Beijing’s geoeconomic agenda.

Future historians will likely remember the G7 summit in Ise-shima last week as marking the revenge of internationalism. The event defied the growing skepticism toward the annual gathering by generating an internationalist consensus among the world’s most advanced economies on today’s most pressing geopolitical issues. Of such issues South China Sea stood out above all else. Given their burgeoning trade relations with China, European countries have historically diverged from the U.S. and Japan over Beijing’s assertiveness. Indeed, all European G7 member states—the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy—signed up for their founding member status in the AIIB in 2015. The latest G7 solidarity over Asian maritime security underscored the member countries’ commitment to the liberal world order transcending geographical distance.

G7 leaders went on to craft a solid strategy to counter China’s OBOR. They endorsed the G7 Ise-shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment that aims to “bridge the existing global demand-supply gap of infrastructure investment by promoting quality infrastructure investment.” This latest G7 initiative has its origin in Tokyo’s $110 billion Partnership for Quality Infrastructure that seeks to promote Japan’s superior quality as well as multilateral cooperation with various international institutions, such as the World Bank. Japan’s infrastructure agenda has already won various major projects across the Eurasian Heartland in direct competition with China’s OBOR while bolstering Washington’s New Silk Road Initiative, including the much-delayed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline. During the Ise-shima summit, Japan’s internationalist approach to global infrastructure development allowed the country to enlist G7 support for its agenda, further boosting its financial commitment totaling $200 billion for the next five years.

As a result, Japan’s newfound internationalist drive for global infrastructure stands to reshape the geoeconomic map currently dominated by China’s OBOR. Japan has an established track record for leading multilateral consortiums in major infrastructure projects, such as the Japan-Turkey consortium for developing Turkmenistan’s Galkynish gas field that had been dominated by China until 2015. The latest G7 infrastructure initiative will boost Tokyo’s multilateral cooperation globally, potentially constraining Beijing’s ability to engage with local governments.

Moreover, Beijing’s own undoing may ironically strengthen Japan’s G7 response to China’s geoeconomic challenge. In fact, economic viability has frequently failed to keep up with Beijing’s unbridled ambitions for the OBOR, often leading to local backlash. For example, as Jakarta learned no end was in sight for the Beijing-funded Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway imbroglio, Indonesian president Joko Widodo met Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during the G7 in Ise-shima to personally seek Tokyo’s investment in a major seaport project. During the summit, Vietnam also welcomed the Tokyo-led G7 initiative for global infrastructure, a move with significant geopolitical implications given Hanoi’s simmering rivalry with China that was on full display during President Obama’s visit in advance of the event.

The significance of this year’s G7 in Japan in advance of the G20 in China in September will be judged by which summit ultimately sets the tone for either the enduring nature of the liberal international order or sweeping tide of revisionist authoritarianism. Obama’s historic Hiroshima and Vietnam visits were symbolic of the legacy he hopes to leave. Yet, symbolism risks complacency without action. The G7’s latest initiative for global infrastructure development confirmed the member countries’ internationalist commitment but whether they can remain unified in the face of Chinese and Russian revisionist alternatives such as OBOR or the Eurasian Economic Union will have to be seen. As Japan passes the G7 baton to Italy next year, the world anxiously expects the world’s seven most advanced democracies and economies to lead toward the triumph of internationalism over revisionism.

===================================

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CjicBcwUUAAf1nu.jpg

G 7 SUMMIT IN JAPAN

On May 27, 2016

 

2 Most Important Topics have been in Discussion...

1. CHINA & RUSSIA...Expanded their MILITARY POWERS BEYOND THEIR NATIONAL BORDERS...

2. CHINA & RUSSIA...Using their SPHERE OF ECONOMIC INFLUENCES

FOR THEIR GLOBAL MILITARY CONTROLS...

 

CHINA & RUSSIA...2 MILITARY HOT SPOTS FOR DOMINANCE ARE

...CRIMEA IN UKRAINE & SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

And CHINA...ONE BELT & ONE ROAD STRATEGY...

CHINA has INVESTED $8 TRILLIONS ON (OBOR)

( ONE BELT-ONE ROAD STRATEGY INVESTMENT )

 

CHINA also PLANNED TO PURSUE ITS GEOECONOMIC AGENDA

OF ATTRACTING MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT IN ITS $100 BILLION

ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK ( AIIB )

TO buy[quote] UP SPACE IN THE WORLD'S KEY GEOSTRATEGIC LOCATIONS 

FOR ITS GEOECONOMIC AGENDA...

 

Therefore, the G 7 must PREPARE and IMPLEMENT A PLAN TO RESPOND TO THE

THREATS OF CHINA & RUSSIA GLOBAL MILITARY & GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOMINANCE...

 

The G 7 SUMMIT has ENDORSED the G 7 INITIATIVE

IN SUPPORTING...TOKYO'S $110 BILLION PARTNERSHIP

FOR THE QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT...

 

The G 7 has also BOLSTER the Washington's New Silk Road Initiatve

in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India ( TAPI ) NATURAL GAS PIPELINE...

 

The G 7 will FURTHER BOOSTING ITS FINANCIAL COMMITMENT

TOTALING $200 BILLION FOR THE NEXT 5 YEARS...

 

BESIDES THESE...THE OBAMA'S TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

and TOKYO'S MAJOR SEAPORT PROJECT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED...

 

IN CONCLUSION

BECAUSE OF NATIONALIST-DRIVEN and AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY IS UBIQUITOUS

AMONG THE AUTHORITARIAM REGIMES.

CHINA & RUSSIA IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO

BY DISPLAYS OF MILITARY FORCE IN CRIMEA & IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

THE G 7 SUMMIT HAS RESPONDED TO THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHASE

IN THE ON GOING SINO-JAPAN GEOECONOMIC COMPETIETION.

IT CHARACTERIZES A GLOBAL TREND FOR THE WORLD'S LIBERAL ECONOMIES

FOR YEARS TO COME...

 

https://qph.is.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-6183885199888cb21505397a13769bed?convert_to_webp=true

http://i2.wp.com/www.dtn7.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/China.jpg?fit=500%2C376

PLEASE, LET ME HAVE THESE ISLANDS...PLEASE...!

 

 

http://cdn-ak.b.st-hatena.com/entryimage/244896100-1426688181_l.jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CLpg3xPUsAAGClm.jpg

NO...! YOU CAN NOT HAVE...UKRAINE...!

THIS IS USED TO BE MY...PLAYGROUND...!

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At Scarborough Shoal,

China Is Playing With Fire:

Retired Admiral

 By Dan De Luce

Foreign Policy Magazine

Thu, Jun 16 2:45 PM PDT

China would risk a potential military confrontation with the United States if it started dredging on a disputed shoal off the coast of the Philippines, retired U.S. Navy Adm. Dennis Blair said Thursday. And in a clash with the United States and its allies in the Philippines, Beijing almost certainly would lose, he said.

“If the Chinese push there, I think there’s going to be trouble,” said Blair, who once oversaw U.S. forces in the region as the former four-star head of Pacific Command. “And it’s trouble that the United States and the Philippines are going to win because the military situation is set up that way.”

To assert its power in the South China Sea and back up its expansionist territorial claims, Beijing has sent out fishing fleets in contested waters and built up artificial islands atop reefs in the past two year years, constructing airstrips and deep-water harbors that can accommodate naval ships.

In a growing rivalry over the strategic waterway, both China and the United States have stepped up patrols of naval ships, reconnaissance planes, and fighter jets in the disputed waters. The deployments have amounted to “shadow boxing” between the two powers and the risk of conflict has remained relatively low, said Blair, who also served as director of national intelligence during President Barack Obama’s first term.

But unlike the disputed Spratly Islands, which are the subject of multiple rival claims from China and several other Southeast Asian countries, the Scarborough Shoal effectively pits Beijing directly against Manila.

With the shoal located less than 150 miles from the Philippines, but 500 miles from China, experts believe Manila has a strong legal case in the disputed claims. The stakes are high as the Philippines has a mutual defense treaty with the United States that could possibly be invoked if Manila sought to defend what it considers sovereign territory.

“I would be surprised if the United States hasn’t told China it’s a shoal too far for them,” Blair told a group of reporters at a briefing at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, where he serves as CEO. “It hasn’t been said publicly, but I hope we have done so privately.”

Tensions rose this week at the shoal after Chinese Coast Guard vessels prevented a Philippine nationalist group from planting a Filipino flag on one of the rock outcroppings.

The shoal is one of many maritime disputes at the center of a legal case the Philippines has brought against China before an international court in The Hague. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is due to rule this month on the case, but China has already vowed to ignore the tribunal’s decision, which is expected to favor Manila.

If China succeeded in taking over Scarborough, it could build airstrips there and enable Beijing to draw a “strategic triangle” linking reefs and islands in the Paracel Islands to the west and the Spratlys to the south, effectively fencing off the South China Sea, experts say. That could pave the way for Beijing to declare a possible air defense identification zone in the area, demanding commercial and military aircraft seek permission before flying through it.

Allowing China to seize complete control of the shoal and launch land reclamation work would represent a “geopolitical loss” for Washington that would be unacceptable, Blair said.

For the United States, the Scarborough Shoal represents “at least a pink line, if not a red line,” Blair said.

If a clash erupted, China would find itself in a difficult position, hundreds of miles from its military bases. Any Chinese aircraft would need to be refueled just to arrive at the location.

“From everything I know militarily, that would be a bad place for China to pick a fight,” he said.

The feud over Scarborough Shoal flared up in 2012, and the United States tried to mediate a deal to defuse the argument. The Philippines complied with the deal and withdrew its ships, but the Chinese never pulled back their vessels and continue to deploy ships at the mouth of the shoal’s bay.

The United States has conveyed its solidarity with the Philippines through a number of symbolic steps in recent months, but has stopped short of publicly announcing any red lines.

Asked if the United States had issued a warning to China not to undertake land reclamation at Scarborough Shoal, State Department spokesperson Anna Richey-Allen said the United States regularly holds discussions with Chinese officials about developments in the South China Sea.

“Beyond that, I cannot comment on the specific content of our diplomatic engagements,” Richey-Allen told Foreign Policy.

“Since 2012, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have sought to block fishing access to the area, restricting the long-standing commercial practices of others. We are concerned that such actions exacerbate tensions in the region and are counterproductive,” she added.

In April, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter made a point of stepping foot on an American aircraft carrier, the USS John C. Stennis, as it patrolled waters west of the Philippines. He then paid a visit to the annual Balikatan exercise, which involved 5,000 troops from the United States, 3,500 troops from the Philippines, and 80 forces from Australia and included an amphibious operation on a hypothetical South China Sea island.

After the exercise, the Pentagon sent out A-10 Thunderbolt warplanes to conduct patrols over Scarborough Shoal.

The United States also has announced plans to rotate troops and aircraft at five bases across the Philippines under a new military cooperation agreement, marking a dramatic about-face in relations as Manila kicked out all American forces more than two decades ago.

Before the ruling from the international court on Manila’s complaint, China has been lobbying other countries for support and launched a public relations campaign to make its case. It apparently scored a diplomatic victory this week when Southeast Asian countries backed off a statement critical of Beijing over its policies in the South China Sea.

The original statement issued Tuesday from foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations underlined the importance of freedom of navigation in the waterway and expressed concern over developments that had “eroded trust and confidence.” But Malaysia’s foreign ministry later retracted the statement without offering an explanation.


 

Photo credit: TED ALJIBE/AFP/Getty Images

==============================

https://qph.is.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-6183885199888cb21505397a13769bed?convert_to_webp=true

IF CONFLICT HAPPENS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

CHINA WILL LOSE EVERY THING IT HAS RECENTLY BUILT...

AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL BE BACK TO THE STATUS QUO

WHERE NO BODY WOULD CLAIM THE WHOLE CHINA SEA...

 

EVERY THING THAT HAS RECENTLY BUILT WOULD BE TOTALLY DESTROYED...

AND THE SEA WILL BE OPENED TO THE WHOLE WORLD

...FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AGAIN...

 

THERE WILL BE NEW RULES

HOW THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION CAN WORK TOGETHER

AND MAKE SURE THAT THE SEA IS THERE TO GIVE BENEFITS TO ALL...

AND NOT JUST ONE NATION ALONE...

 

CHINA WILL BE FORCED TO ACCEPT

...NOT TO EXPAND ITS BORDER BEYOND

A COUPLE HUNDRED MILES FROM ITS SHORE

INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

THE SAME RULE WILL ALSO APPLY TO ALL THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN

COUNTRIES AROUND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

https://nytsyn-production.s3.amazonaws.com/photos/0128/2204/1282204_525_350_w.jpg

NO MORE CHINA WALLS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

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philippines.jpg?itok=8sO3KY4x

South China Sea Clashes Are Fracturing ASEAN

By 

As The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea territorial conflict—levied by the Philippines against China in 2013—is approaching, questions abound whether the United States and its allies can maintain peace amid rising tensions stemming from an increasingly assertive China. While the ruling may set a precedent in strictly legal terms, it will ultimately be nonbinding, with the tribunal lacking the power to enforce its decision. Beijing has not spared the rod in condemning the “unilateral” move by the Philippines, and has managed to coax some forty countries onto its side in an attempt to prevent the UN General Assembly from discussing the territorial disputes any further. Moreover, a number of ASEAN states with no territorial claims in the South China Sea have broken ranks and signed a statement agreeing not to let the dispute affect relations with China.

In any case, China has already preemptively rejected the outcome of the tribunal, arguing that the arbitration “is neither well-grounded nor justified” and that the decision “won’t affect China’s sovereignty over South China Sea islands, or whitewash the Philippines’ illegal occupation of China’s islands and reefs in the South China Sea.” As J. Michael Cole has pointed out, this condemnation is based on “the historical narrative of ’national humiliation’ and the belief that as a product of Western imperialism, global institutions and the legal architecture of international law are little more than mechanisms to maintain a skewed distribution of power.” In effect, the court’s ruling against China is “evidence” that the West is attempting to keep China down. In the wake of the ruling against it, China is expected to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed area with the Philippines to protect its interests, as it did over the East China Sea in 2013. U.S. officials have expressed concern, stating that an ADIZ would prove provocative and destabilizing.

In that context, Vietnam is becoming a key player in the U.S.-led effort to prevent the South China Sea disputes from escalating. Owing to their strategic positions along Vietnam’s coast, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang can play decisive roles in granting U.S. vessels better access to the South China Sea, where China seeks to protect its claim through land reclamations near the Spratly and Paracel islands. Vietnam could declare an ADIZ over the Paracels, but for this to be effective in deterring Beijing from establishing an ADIZ, Vietnam needs to be able to credibly signal its resolve.

In fact, enhanced cooperation between Vietnam and the United States in recent years might aid in achieving this signaling. Most importantly, however, it is testimony to the fact that the United States regards Vietnam as a pillar in its South China Sea policy. For example, the annual Naval Engagement Activity with the Vietnam People’s Navy, and the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense sending Vietnamese officers to U.S. staff colleges and other military institutions, have promoted cooperation and mutual trust between the former foes. Add the May 2016 lifting of its arms embargo against Vietnam, and all signs point towards a nascent U.S.-Vietnamese partnership.

But growing problems within ASEAN, leading to fracturing that could ultimately weaken the organization’s resolve and unity, may offset the benefits of enhanced collaboration between Vietnam and the United States. A glimpse of ASEAN’s weakening was provided on June 14, when ASEAN members officially expressed deep concern over escalating tensions in the South China Sea in a common statement issued at a special meeting in China, only to retract the statement shortly thereafter—probably due to Chinese pressure. A Malaysian foreign ministry spokeswoman stated simply that “we have to retract the media statement by the ASEAN foreign ministers . . . as there are urgent amendments to be made.”

This embarrassing display of crumbling under Chinese pressure comes on top of emerging rifts that threaten ASEAN’s efficacy as an organization to help steer and contain China. Philippine president-elect Rodrigo Duterte is likely to embark on a reversal of his predecessor’s hard-line policy towards maritime disputes with China, and pivot away from Japan and the United States. Duterte favors direct multilateral negotiations with Beijing and—alongside voicing doubts about the usefulness of the forthcoming arbitration ruling—offered to backtrack on sovereignty-related issues in exchange for economic deals with China.

However, Duterte’s approach plays directly into China’s hands, because the Philippines needs to work together with other claimants such as Vietnam and Malaysia, to be able to push back against China’s actions. However, their support is conditional on Manila’s strategy being aimed at countering China, and since Duterte’s China policy is anemic, the potential for a strong diplomatic front is seriously undermined.

Meanwhile, deteriorating relations between Vietnam and Cambodia are stoking fears that the two countries’ smoldering border conflict could reignite. With eyes on the 2018 presidential election, Sam Rainsy and his Cambodia National Rescue Party are running on a platform of strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment, spurring on the dispute by expressing support for provocations committed by activists illegally entering Vietnam. The issue is exacerbated by fears in Hanoi that a Cambodia under Rainsy could use border disputes as a means of distracting Vietnam from the South China Sea, thereby weakening its hand against China. Were this to happen, Vietnam could get sucked into conflict with China and Cambodia alike, diminishing its capacity to meaningfully contribute to U.S. strategy in the Pacific.

In the medium term, the tribunal’s hyped-up decision is likely to turn out to be a flop, seeing how the Philippines is unlikely to enforce it, Vietnam is threatened by grave security threats on its western border, and ASEAN’s overall unity is crumbling. As such, South China Sea issues must be championed by the next U.S. president with even greater force. The future administration must not waver and should reaffirm its support for Vietnam in the case of a renewed border flare-up, and push to maintain ASEAN’s relevance as a forum for discussion on South China Sea issues for China and littoral states. Otherwise, the vaunted “Pivot to Asia” will crumble into the waters of the South China Sea.

Robert Held is a financial consultant currently living in Geneva, Switzerland.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/U.S. Navy

=========================================

https://qph.is.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-6183885199888cb21505397a13769bed?convert_to_webp=true

"...UNITED WE STAND

DIVIDED WE FALL..."

 

THIS SAYING CA BE REALIZED IF THERE'S WAR BREAKS OUT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA...

CHINA WILL USE WHATEVER ITS ECONOMIC POWER & INFLUENCES TO PRESSURE

SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF ...ASIAN...TO SWITCH TO CHINA'S SIDE...

WHEN THAT HAPPENS...THE SOLIDARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF...ASIAN...AND THE USA

WILL NO LONGER BE STRONG TO FACE CHINA...

 

TO FACE CHINA...THE USA & THE MEMBERS OF ASIAN MUST FACE 2 FRONTS

1. SOCIAL & POLITICAL UNITY TO FACE THE WORLD PUBLIC RELATION...

2. MILITARY & ECONOMY UNITY TO GET HELP & SUPPORT OF THE WORLD

COMMUNITIES BEHIND...

 

IF THERE'S ANY CRACK IN EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF THE ABOVE STRATEGIES

THEN THE FIGHT AGAINST CHINA WILL BE HARDER...

 

AS FOR CHINA...

" DIVIDED AND CONQUER..."

IS THE STRATEGY...

 

IF CHINA WINS...

ALL THE MEMBERS OF ASIAN WILL BE THE LOSERS...

B/C FROM THERE ON...NO ONE NATION CAN STOP

CHINA TO WALK ALL OVER THEIR DEAD BODIES...

 

https://nytsyn-production.s3.amazonaws.com/photos/0128/2204/1282204_525_350_w.jpg

NO MORE CHINA WALLS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

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China military

China has all but ended

the charade of a peaceful rise ???

There was a time when China tried hard to convince the world that its rise is peaceful.

That pretense was abandoned seven years ago when, in the wake of the “Great Recession”, China thought its time had come to claim its place as controlling “all under heaven”, or tianxia, in Asia.

Like all great powers in history, China’s emergence is accompanied not just by military expansion but also by assertion of its own law.

In China’s narrative, its rise is still peaceful. The nation built military installations on reefs and rocks in the South China Sea simply because it claims to have owned them from time immemorial. From the Chinese standpoint, the South China Sea is a core interest. There can be no backing down.

To justify its position on this and other issues, Beijing creates an imagined universe where, in the words of Bill Hayton, the BBC specialist on the South China Sea, “they start from the position that everything China does is virtuous and correct and therefore that anyone who disagrees must be wrong”. What China thinks is right must be the law. The day The Hague tribunal’s ruling on the Philippines’ South China Sea claims was made public, foreign minister Wang Yi ( 王毅 ) called it a “farce” and said that China, by refusing to accept the ruling, was “upholding international rule of law”.

China has emerged as the dominant power. Its neighbors have kept their mouths shut. A statement released by foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations did not mention the tribunal, though it did endorse rule of law. The fact is that China is seen as the key to economic development in the region. And while the US talks about maintaining “primacy” in the military realm, China is already dominant in much of the region.

Contrary to commonly accepted views, China sees no need to challenge the US militarily and wants to avoid such a confrontation unless pushed. The US is unlikely to push. China, through its artificial islands in the South China Sea, can project its air and naval power throughout the area and check American bases in the Philippines. While other countries may still occupy a reef here or a rock there, China is in overall control.

Since 2013, when Manila launched its case, Beijing has called for bilateral talks instead. The day the ruling was issued, Wang said: “Now the farce is over. It is time that things come back to normal.”

China is getting its way. The Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte, decided that war is not an option. The alternative, in the new leader’s words is “peaceful talks”. China and the Philippines, in effect, will agree to share economic resources. Joint development is theoretically on the table. Manila also hopes for vast inflows of Chinese investment.

The ruling won’t deter China from plans to increase its dominance of Southeast Asia and the larger region. In its imagined world, the realization of Xi Jinping’s (  習近平  ) Chinese Dream will place China once again at the centre of the world, after a couple of centuries of being disrupted by Western imperialism. In the Chinese imagination, this is not subjugation of neighbours but simply restoration of the normal order. To some, this is a return to the traditional concept of  tianxia , with barbarians benefiting from Chinese civilization.

China’s leaders no longer refer to neighbours as barbarians, but they do recall that Confucian culture is embedded in many Asian countries and that the Chinese system of writing was borrowed by many, including Japan, Korea and Vietnam.

Perhaps that is why Singapore, a predominantly Chinese society, draws disproportionate Chinese ire when it is seen as betraying the Chinese cause, not just Beijing’s interests. The elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew did this in 2009 by appealing to Washington to remain in Asia. “The size of China makes it impossible for the rest of Asia, including Japan and India, to match it in weight and capacity in about 20 to 30 years,” he said. “So we need America to strike a balance.”

The elder statesman’s words were followed two years later by Barack Obama’s policy of rebalancing to Asia, which China sees as containment. Lee’s son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in Washington, said that the rebalance had been “warmly welcomed by all Asean countries”. The Global Times accused him of siding with the US.

http://upload.m4.cn/2016/0117/1452998160162.png

Pres. XI JINPING

WANTED TO BE THE LEADER

WHO RE-ESTABLISHED THE NEW CHINA EMPIRE

 

http://photocdn.sohu.com/20150413/Img411165299.jpg

CHINA SOUTH CHINA SEA ...DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES...

China sees its dominance as crucial because of its own development needs. It wants the resources in the waters as well as under the seabed. It will continue its sticks-and-carrots policy, using trade and investment as weapons. The China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with capital of US$100 billion, has begun approving its first projects, greatly elevating Chinese bargaining power. The “One Belt, One Road” plan will also bring investment to nearby countries.

China’s vital interests are engaged elsewhere as well, such as South Korea, Japan and India, and relations are strained.

The official Chinese media reprimanded South Korea for having agreed in July to deploy the US-developed THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) anti-ballistic missile system. China considers the system a threat to its own security.

Beijing reminds Japan of its invasion of China more than 70 years after the second world war. In mid-August, the People’s Daily published a commentary warning that “Japan’s denial of past military aggression undermines world peace”. China also puts pressure on Japan by sending hundreds of vessels into areas near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, controlled by Japan but claimed by China.

As for India, Beijing has campaigned for years to keep it from becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. More recently, China opposed Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Of course, the biggest villain in the Chinese mind is the US. Fu Ying ( 傅瑩 ), a spokesperson for the National People’s Congress, wrote recently that the problems in the South China Sea stem from 2009, when the Obama administration launched its rebalancing strategy. There is one problem with that explanation. The rebalance wasn’t announced until two years later, in late 2011. Fu’s explanation, like much else, was part of the Chinese imagination, and in that imagination, all that matters is the central role of China.

https://dev.cohladas.sk/images/nespracovane_clanky/1544806666.jpg

CHINA'S ONE BELT - ONE ROAD POLICY

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People cycle past a billboard for the upcoming G20 summit in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, China, July 29, 2016. Picture taken July 29, 2016. REUTERS/Aly Song - RTSL4WN

Out of Control

Even on the Eve of the G20,

China Just Can’t Stop Being a Bully

One might have thought Beijing would cool it before the confab of the world’s richest nations
that begins Sunday. But no. And there are reasons.

09.01.16 10:00 PM ET

China, for the first time ever, is hosting the G20, the grouping of the world’s largest economies.

Beijing has a lot riding on the summit, which starts Sunday in Hangzhou. China’s economy, although stabilized, is still fragile, and the country’s officials hope the world’s heavyweights will implement stimulus plans so they can buy[quote] more Chinese products.

China’s two-way trade fell a stunning 8.0 percent in 2015, and since then the country’s performance has deteriorated. In the first seven months of this year, exports were down 7.4 percent and imports off 10.5 percent.

 

So China, whose economy in reality is barely growing, could use help from its 19 powerful visitors. Yet Beijing is not acting like it needs favors. Especially since June, it has engaged in extraordinarily provocative behavior in an arc stretching from India to South Korea.

One might have thought Beijing would cool it in the run-up to the G20 to ensure a successful meeting.

In recent months, China’s diplomats have been fanning out across the globe to lay groundwork for the event. For instance, Foreign Minister Wang Yi flew down to New Delhi in the middle of last month to persuade Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who will go to Hangzhou, not to raise contentious issues like the South China Sea.

Moreover, senior officials, seeking to keep geopolitical matters off the agenda, have been putting their points across to the media in a clearly orchestrated campaign. “The Hangzhou summit must focus on economic issues,” Li Baodong, a foreign vice-minister, told the South China Morning Post. “This is what people want to talk about most at the summit.”

Actually, it’s not. G20 members don’t seem to be overly concerned about the global economy at the moment. On the contrary, everyone wants to talk about China.

Beijing has been roiling the international system in many ways, but none more troubling than trying to expand its territory, often by force.

 

In India, for instance, there has been an uptick in incursions of the Chinese army into Indian-controlled territory in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. In July, China’s troops intruded into Uttarakhand, a state close to New Delhi. Up until then, that region had been mostly free of such dangerous incidents.

In the East China Sea, Beijing last month surrounded the Senkaku Islands with 324 fishing trawlers and 16 patrol boats. China claims the uninhabited features that Japan in fact administers, and Beijing has been trying to unnerve Tokyo with continual incursions, near-incursions, and assorted other provocations.

In the South China Sea, Beijing has been trying to enforce expansive territorial claims that, after a July 12 arbitral ruling in The Hague, have virtually no basis in international law.

To show its defiance of the decision, which legally binds China, Beijing sent out hundreds of trawlers, protected by its maritime surveillance craft, to surround Scarborough Shoal. The feature is far from China and just 124 nautical miles to the main Philippine island of Luzon. Moreover, the Chinese military flew a nuclear-capable H-6K bomber over Scarborough and started regular combat air patrols over the South China Sea.

As a result of all this provocative conduct, several nations are beginning to coalesce against Beijing.

Modi, for example, will stop over in Hanoi before going to Hangzhou, and there he is expected to stitch up agreements to help the Vietnamese defend themselves against Chinese expansionism.

President Obama, after the G20, will visit Laos. That will be the first time a sitting American president has gone there, a signal Beijing is about to lose its hold on one of its few reliable friends in the region.

Moreover, the U.S. and India on Monday signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, which allows for unprecedented military cooperation, including the sharing of base facilities.

So why is Beijing pursuing a clearly counterproductive foreign policy?

There are many explanations for what the Wall Street Journal in June of last year called China’s “impulsive style.”The primary reason, I believe, is turmoil in Beijing due to the incomplete leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping.

Xi, since becoming Communist Party general secretary in November 2012, has taken extraordinary steps to grab power, breaking decades-old norms designed to ensure stability. For a time, it appeared he had succeeding in firming up his grip, but in March infighting broke out into the open, indicating there had been disunity all along.

That month, there were striking displays of defiance of China’s ruler. The Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Xi’s main instrument in his political purge, posted an essay indirectly criticizing the Chinese supremo. There was also a public call for him to step down, which ended up on a semi-official website.

The maneuvering among civilians now appears to be intensifying as they prepare for the 19th Party Congress next year. To make matters even more complicated, as senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army become increasingly influential power brokers, the military has become an increasingly troubled institution.

There are two main reasons for discord. First, Xi Jinping, as he sought to get rid of the military allies of his civilian adversaries, has roiled the officer corps with unprecedented purges. Second, Xi’s reorganization of the PLA, perhaps the most sweeping in the history of the People’s Republic, has created tensions among generals and admirals, many of whom have lost—or will lose—important postings.

The symptoms of turmoil are obvious.

Last month, three senior officers—one a general—committed suicide. Moreover, at the end of the month, for the first time in Xi’s rule, an active-duty general was detained for corruption. From all outside appearances, Gen. Wang Jianping was sidelined because he had links to a Xi adversary and his departure allowed China’s ruler to pick an ally to take Wang’s place. The situation in the armed forces obviously remains fluid.

In this chaotic situation, it is not surprising that Chinese foreign policy has begun to lose coherence, largely because hawkish elements, both civilian and military, now have latitude to do what they want.

And as provocative as China is now, it could become even more so. The South China Morning Post last month reported that China might start turning Scarborough into a military fortification after the Hangzhou G20, but before the American presidential election.

Reclaiming this feature, which it seized from the Philippines in early 2012, could be the incident triggering the conflict that many see coming because Beijing would be making permanent its act of aggression.

The Chinese know this is one of the worst times to commit provocations. Yet at a moment when their country needs calm, its leaders just can’t help themselves. That means things are terribly wrong in in the Chinese capital.

49093091.cached.jpg

================================

 

G20...ZOO LI YUAV MUAJ TEEB MEEM NTAU TSHAJ

QHOV NWS YUAV DAWS TEEB MEEM TAU...

 

ZOO LI SAWV DAWS NPAJ TUAJ LOS TSUAS LAM TUAJ

KOM TAS KEV CAI XWB...VIM SAWV DAWS MUAJ NTAU TSAV YAM

NYOB NRUAB SIAB YUAV TUAJ MUAJ HAIS TAWM KOM TAS...

 

TAB SIS THAUM HAIS TAWM KOM TAS LAWM CES

YUAV UA RAU SAWV DAWS NYIAS CHIM NYIAS ROV QAB MUS TSEV LAWM XWB

THAUM KAWG SAWV DAWS COV TEEB MEEM YUAV ROV QAB NYOB QHOV QUB

TSIS TAS LI NTAWD NWS TSEEM TSUAS MUAJ KUS YUAV LOJ DUA QUB NTXIV

VIM DAWS TSIS TAU...

 

QHOV TEEB MEEM LOJ TSHAJ PLAWV CES NWS YOG

TEEB MEEM NYOB RAU

SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

VIM SOUTH CHINA SEA PUAV LEEJ POOB RAU 3 YAM XWS LI

1. KEV NRHIAV NOJ NRHIAV HAUS & KEV SIV NKOJ

THAUJ KHOOM UA KEV LAG LUAM KHIAV MUS LOS SAB HIAV TXWV

2. KEV SIB TXEEB CIAM DEJ CIAM AV

(LEEJ TWG MUAJ DAG ZOG DUA CES YEEJ XWB )

3. KEV SIB TXEEB FWJ CHIM...

( NWS YOG QHOV SUAV/CHINA NTHUAV FWJ CHIM TUAJ CAIJ TSUJ SAWV DAWS )

 

NTAU LUB TEB CHAWS TUAJ ZAUM NOV

KUJ YUAV YOG TUAJ HAIS KOJ SUAV/CHINA

MUAB KEV NCAJ NCEES ME NTSIS RAU NWS COV NEIGHBORS

THIAB KOM SUAV/CHINA GUARANTEE...FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

RAU NEEG NTIAJ TEB...!

 

THIAB YOG SUAV/CHINA YUAV NTHAUV FWJ CHIM

LOS KOM NWS UA KOM HAUM XEEB

&

KOM NWS COV NEIGHBORS ZOO SIAB UA NTEJ TSO...!

https://nytsyn-production.s3.amazonaws.com/photos/0128/2204/1282204_525_350_w.jpg

NO MORE CHINA WALLS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA...

 

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WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN CHINA...

IN ORDER FOR CHINA TO MOVE FORWARD IN PROGRESS...!

or

THE DIRTY CHINA...!

 

WHO'S USING WHOM IN THIS GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION...

THERE WILL BE AN END TO THIS IN THE FUTURE

BUT WHO WILL BE THE WINNERS & LOOSERS...WHEN IT HAPPENS...?

 

YOU CAN NOT WIN EVERY THING...

BUT WHO WILL LIKELY WON THE MOST...OUT OF THIS COMPETITION...?

 

AS FAR AS I SEE IT NOW...

CHINA WILL GAIN A LOT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH...

BUT IN THE LONG RUN...CHINA WILL SUFFER THE MOST...!

 

1. ITS COUNTRY WILL BE VERY POLLUTED...

2. ITS POPULATION WILL BE VERY SICK...

3. ONCE THE RICH AMERICAN COMPANIES

POLLUTED OUT OF CHINA & THEN JUST LEAVE...

THEN CHINA WILL STRUG.GLE WITH ITS ECONOMY AGAIN...

4. BY THEN...CHINA WILL BECOME AN UNSTABLE COUNTRY...

5. BY THEN THERE WILL BE A NEW...REVOLUTION...FOR DEMOCRACY & FREEDOM...

 

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POLITICS and MILITARY of CHINA

&

THOSE OF THE...USA... IN SOUTHEAST ASIA and ASIA...

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TEEB MEEM

SOUTH CHINA SEA

YUAV TSIS TAU XAUS YOOJ YIM...!

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92a7b1aff4160f4842b5db1105e238cefd994b14

Southeast Asian Nations Feud over China

Ayee Macaraig, Martin Abbugao,AFP Sun, Aug 6 3:29 AM PDT

Manila (AFP) - Southeast Asian nations feuded Sunday over how to respond to Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, with Vietnam insisting on a tough stance but Cambodia lobbying hard for Beijing, diplomats said.

The debates among foreign ministers of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a security forum in the Philippines were the latest in years of strugg[quote]les to deal with competing claims to the strategically vital sea.

The ministers failed to release a customary joint statement after meeting on Saturday because of their differences on the sea issue, and follow-up negotiations on Sunday did not end the stand-off, two diplomats involved in the talks told AFP.

"There's still no consensus," one of the diplomats said, adding the disagreements over the wordings on the sea issue were holding up the release of the communique.

"Vietnam is adamant, and China is effectively using Cambodia to champion its interests. But the Philippines is trying very hard to broker compromise language."

Vietnam had insisted that tough language be inserted into the statement expressing concern over "land reclamation", a reference to an explosion in recent years of Chinese artificial island building in contested parts of the waters.

Cambodia, one of China's strongest allies within ASEAN, has firmly resisted, according to the diplomats involved in the talks in Manila, as well as an excerpt of proposed Cambodian resolution obtained by AFP on Sunday.

China claims nearly all of the sea, through which $5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes, and its artificial islands have raised concerns it could eventually build military bases there and establish de facto control over the waters.

Its sweeping claims overlap with those of ASEAN members Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

- No consensus -

Tensions over the sea have long vexed ASEAN, which operates on a consensus basis but has had to balance the interests of rival claimants and those more aligned to China.

Critics of China have accused it of trying to divide ASEAN with strong-armed tactics and chequebook diplomacy, enticing smaller countries in the bloc such as Cambodia and Laos to support it.

The Philippines, under previous president Benigno Aquino, had been one of the most vocal critics of China and filed a case before a UN-backed tribunal.

The tribunal last year ruled China's sweeping claims to the sea had no legal basis.

But China, despite being a signatory to the UN's Convention on the Law of the Sea, ignored the ruling.

The Philippines, under new President Rodrigo Duterte, decided to play down the verdict in favour of pursuing warmer ties with Beijing. This in turn led to offers of billions of dollars in investments or aid from China.

"It's clear that China's pressure on individual ASEAN governments has paid off with few prepared even to reiterate statements that they have made many times before," Bill Hayton, a South China Sea expert and associate fellow with the Asia Programme at Chatham House in London, told AFP.

"Beijing's task has been made easier because the Philippines holds the (ASEAN) chair this year."

The ASEAN foreign ministers and their Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on Sunday adopted a framework for negotiating a code of conduct to defuse tensions in the sea.

Wang hailed this as a breakthrough.

But analysts cautioned not to place too much significance on the agreement on a framework, pointing out it came 15 years after a similar document was signed committing the parties to negotiating a code of conduct.

Philippine foreign ministry spokesman Robespierre Bolivar told reporters the ASEAN joint statement would be released by the time meetings with foreign ministers from other Asia-Pacific nations wrapped up in Manila on Tuesday.

But one diplomat involved in the talks told AFP that Vietnam and Cambodia were holding firm on Sunday.

"The atmosphere is still very tense due to the strong national interests of Vietnam and Cambodia," the diplomat said.

 

DEV TUAJ TXEEM ZOS...TAB SIS MIV TSEEM ROV SIB KHAWB MIV...

WQ8pRfw.gif

 

MIV SIB KHAWB & SIB TOG

DEV TSEEM TUAJ CHEEM THIAB XWB...!

YUAV UA CAS...MIV THIAJ YUAV CAUM TAU* TAWM ZOS NA...?

( THE 2 CATS ARE...CAMBODIA & VIETNAM...)

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